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I study bequest and wealth accumulation behavior of the wealthy (subject to the estate tax) shortly
before death. The onset of a terminal illness leads to a very significant reduction in the value of estates
reported on tax returns - 15 to 20% with illness lasting "months to years" and about 5 to 10% in case
of illness reported as lasting "days to weeks".  I provide evidence suggesting that these findings cannot
be explained by real shocks to net worth such as due to medical expenses or lost income, but instead
reflect "deathbed" estate planning.  The results suggest that wealthy individuals actively care about
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This paper provides empirical evidence about behavior of wealthy individuals following
the onset of a terminal illness using (publicly available) individual-level estate tax return
data (National Archives and Records Administration, 1995) for decedents whose tax returns
were ﬁled in 1977. This is the only publicly available dataset of this kind and one of
very few data sources allowing to study wealth holdings and behavior of the wealthy.1 I
analyze decisions of estate taxpayers shortly before their deaths. My strategy is to compare
estates of individuals who suﬀered terminal illnesses of diﬀerent lengths. Approximately
20% of taxpayers subject to the estate tax die instantaneously. The central empirical fact
established in this paper is that their estates as reported on tax returns are 10-18% greater
than estates of those who suﬀered from a lengthy illness. This could be consistent with large
medical or long-term care expenses or with loss of income following the onset of a terminal
illness. However, based on other information from tax returns and AHEAD/HRS exit
surveys I show that these are unlikely to be the right explanations. Instead, the empirical
ﬁndings suggest that this response reﬂects planning for the disposition of an estate.
While the notion that the wealthy pursue tax avoidance is hardly new or surprising,
the results shed a new light on motivations behind wealth accumulation. The presence of
signiﬁcant tax-motivated actions following the onset of a terminal illness reveals a desire
to control disposition of assets, but it also implies that more tax planning could have been
pursued earlier. Tax avoidance is easier and more eﬀective if pursued early. Furthermore,
those who die instantaneously do not get a chance to make such adjustments. This suggests
that there are real costs to early planning that result in holding on to wealth while alive and
that (rational or irrational) “procrastination” in estate planning is an important phenomena.
I present additional ﬁndings that are consistent with the notion that the wealthy hold on to
their wealth until they die: in cross-section wealth is increasing with age until the maximum
observed age of ninety-eight. Because cross-sectional wealth proﬁles are potentially aﬀected
by diﬀerential mortality, these ﬁndings do not unequivocally prove that wealth increases
with age. Still, the sample considered is more uniform than usual so that selection is less
likely to be an issue and, despite that, the gradient is steeper (estimated at approximately
3% per year) than observed in datasets representative of the full population. Together with
bequest-driven adjustments before death, these patterns cast doubt on the life-cycle motive
for wealth accumulation as the sole explanation of behavior of the wealthy.
The results suggest a need for a model that can simultaneously explain wealth accu-
mulation beyond own consumption or precautionary needs, some degree of concern about
beneﬁciaries and signiﬁcant delays in planning despite real consequences. Holding on to
wealth until one gets terminally ill despite tax consequences suggests a “capitalistic spirit”
1The analysis uses individuals with estates of at least $120,000 in 1976, corresponding to roughly $360,000
nowadays. The group considered corresponds to approximately 6% of adult deaths. Information on more
than 29,000 high net worth tax returns is in the data vastly exceeding the coverage of this group in any
survey dataset. Sampling rates are also higher and the eﬀective exemption level is lower than in any of the
more recent IRS samples of estate tax returns (that are not available publicly). I discuss the data in more
detail in Section 2.1.
1or wealth in utility motive where wealth accumulation takes place because stock of wealth
provides ﬂow of utility. The presence of active though delayed planning suggests however
that such a framework will not ﬁt all empirical facts. An alternative is for individuals to
simultaneously value both wealth and bequests. It is natural to expect that the presence of
such a preference that’s ultimately reﬂected in tax-motivated actions should aﬀect wealth
accumulation prior to the onset of a terminal illness, although results in this paper leave
open the possibility of “lexicographic” preferences under which wealth accumulation has
nothing to do with beneﬁciaries yet transfers to them are preferred to transfers to the IRS.
Another important possibility for explaining my ﬁndings is behavioral: individuals who
have diﬃculty acknowledging their own mortality may delay planning and oversave.
Other than establishing the drop in net worth, I ﬁnd that the response is stronger for
younger individuals and that administrative expenses associated with the estate fall. I
also show direct evidence of increased planning: transfers before death increase, although
this response does not reﬂect simple direct inter vivos giving but rather it reﬂects more
complicated transfers that are pre-arranged but take eﬀect only at the time of death.2 Such
transfers are likely to be a ﬁngerprint of more sophisticated avoidance strategies that are not
directly observed on the tax return. Consistent with a tax motive, I ﬁnd that the response
for a subset of individuals who died in 1977, following a tax cut that took place on January
1st 1977, is much weaker.
I ﬁnd no evidence that these wealthy taxpayers experienced any quantitatively important
ﬁnancial hardship due to lost income. I also ﬁnd no evidence that debts increase suggesting
that taxpayers do not experience diﬃculties dealing with terminal expenses. I discuss
other evidence suggesting that while end of life expenditures are important for most of the
population, they have very low wealth elasticity and are not of major importance at the
top of the distribution. As far as I know, this is the ﬁrst paper that documents low wealth
elasticity of terminal expenditures. This information is not observed on the tax returns
and therefore I rely on AHEAD/HRS surveys to shed some light on this issue. I ﬁnd that
medical, funeral and related expenditures in the last two years of life for individuals who
would meet the estate ﬁling threshold in my data (roughly $360,000 nowadays) constitute
at most 4% of estates (they are on average 45% for the full sample) and do not show a
strong gradient with respect to the length of illness. In particular, these expenditures are
much smaller than the estimated eﬀects and thereby cannot explain the drop in net worth.
Finally, I document changes in the allocation of assets. Interestingly, I do not ﬁnd a
disproportionate decrease in cash holdings perhaps reﬂecting no outright tax evasion, but
also consistent with income from sales of other assets oﬀsetting any cash distributions. That
cash holdings do not fall disproportionately is another argument against the relevance of
any liquidity-related problems. One indication that outright cheating may be facilitated by
a longer illness is that the category of “other assets” responds strongly for smaller estates.
Items speciﬁcally mentioned on the tax return that fall into this category are jewelry, furs,
paintings, antiques, rare books, coins and stamps and household goods: these are, likely,
2As an example, an outright transfer of a house would be an inter vivos gift, but a transfer of a house
with retained right to use it until death is a lifetime transfer and should be included on the estate tax return.
2things that can be easily concealed from a tax collector. For those with moderate wealth
(who would not be subject to taxation in 2005), I ﬁnd evidence that farms and business
assets disappear or lose (reported) value following the onset of a terminal illness. This is
no longer true for higher net worth individuals, but for all categories I ﬁnd that corporate
stock (the category that includes closely held corporations) responds strongly.
The econometric analysis of the data from estate tax returns is complicated due to the
presence of truncation: only estates that are larger than ﬁling threshold are observable by
the researcher. To my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper taking this issue seriously and
I ﬁnd that addressing that the data comes from a truncated sample aﬀects the results
signiﬁcantly. I rely on a number of diﬀerent methods to deal with truncation and ﬁnd that
results are robust to these approaches. I use both parametric and semi-parametric methods
that require weaker distributional assumptions. I also rely on availability of information a
few years before death to deﬁne subsamples on which truncation is less severe and verify
that the results are robust to this approach as well.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, I discus the data and present my
econometric strategy. Section 3 analyzes the response of net worth to the length of illness
and section 4 discusses channels behind this response. Conclusions are in the ﬁnal section.
2 Data and econometric strategy
2.1 Data
I rely on the Decedent Public Use File (DPUS) available from the National Archives and
Records Administration (1995). This dataset was constructed by linking information from
four sources: the SSA 10% Continuous Work History Sample “decedent” ﬁle that includes
deaths that occurred between 1974 and June 1977, the IRS Statistics of Income sample
of estate tax returns ﬁled in 1977 and both 1969 and 1974 IRS Individual Master Files
comprised of income tax returns ﬁled in 1970 and 1975 respectively.3 I limit attention to
estate taxpayers (I do not observe estates of others) and use information from their 1977
estate tax returns and income tax returns for 1969 and 1974.
The dataset contains information about 40462 estate tax returns. This is a stratiﬁed
sample that includes 100% of 1977 returns with gross estates above $500,000, 20% of returns
between $200,000 and $500,000, and 12.5% of returns with gross estates below $200,000.
In all reported speciﬁcations I weight observations by the inverse of sampling probability.
The threshold for estate ﬁling increased in 1977 from $60,000 (gross estate) to $120,000.4 I
use net worth constructed by subtracting debts from gross estate as the criterion for sample
selection. Net worth is necessarily smaller than gross estate and therefore all individuals
3The link with the CWHS is not important for this paper. Its main purpose in creating this dataset was
to identify deaths for non-estate taxpayers. The variables from the CWHS present in the dataset are race,
sex and age (the latter two would be observable for estate taxpayers anyway) but unfortunately earnings
information (which is present in the SSA version of the CWHS) is not included.
4Figures denominated in 1976 dollars should be approximately tripled to obtain 2004 dollars.
3with net worth above the gross estate ﬁling threshold were subject to the ﬁling requirement.5
There are 29,407 observations with net worth above $120,000 drawn from the universe of
112,600 deaths (obtained as the sum of inverse sampling probabilities). The numbers of
adult (21 and up) deaths in each of 1976 and 1977 were around 1.8 million so that the data
corresponds to about 6% of all adult decedents. Thus, this group includes a fairly broad
segment at the top of wealth distribution. In particular, it is signiﬁcantly broader than
those subject to estate taxation nowadays, or at any period other than the 1970s. I will
also show, therefore, results for those with net worth greater than $500,000 (in 1976 dollars)
that corresponds to a little more than the 2005 estate tax threshold of $1.5 million.6
Estate tax return data are very detailed and contain information about the composition
of estate, deductions, some additional schedules, tax credits etc. as well as age, marital
status and gender. Individual income tax data contain a few basic variables such as the
adjusted gross income, wages and salaries, dividends and interest, information about ex-
emptions claimed and a few additional items. There is no information about the state of
residence (other than community/non-community property state distinction) and the ex-
act date of death. It is possible to ascertain whether death occurred in 1977 or earlier by
comparing the tax liability reported in the data to the size of taxable estate.7
For the most part, the analysis will be limited to married males. In the considered period
married male decedents were subject to heavier taxation than now. The unlimited marital
deduction was not introduced until 1981. Up until 1976, 50% of the estate was deductible.
Starting in 1977, the marital deduction was increased to the larger of $250,000 or 50% of the
estate. Therefore, married male decedents were subject to taxation in the period covered
by the data, but the tax treatment changed between 1976 and 1977.8 Responses of diﬀerent
marital and gender groups are likely diﬀerent because their circumstances are diﬀerent: for
example, any decision of a widow is observed only after her husband died. On the other
hand, response of a married person needs to take into account that there may be additional
adjustments by the surviving spouse. As a result, diﬀerent groups should be considered
separately. As will be discussed below, the information about 1969 income of an individual
is important for the analysis. While information about 1969 Adjusted Gross Income (AGI)9
is in the data for 92% of men, it is missing for 48% of women. This is particularly common
5This eliminates less than 0.5% of returns with gross estate above the threshold but net worth below.
6The data captures the population that is hard to observe in conventional survey data. The only large
survey that oversamples high wealth population is the Survey of Consumer Finances which is a cross-section
of the living population, and therefore does not allow for studying implications of increased mortality risk
(and, despite its oversampling of the wealthy, it does not approach the sample size available here).
7I was able to perform limited tabulations on the same estate tax return data held at the SOI (but
without the link to income tax returns) and obtain information about the distribution of dates of deaths for
this sample. 6169 deaths occurred in 1977, 32459 in 1976, 1345 in 1975, 239 in 1974 and 250 prior to that.
8Two other important tax changes took place in 1977: gift and estate taxation were integrated and rules
regarding transfers made within three years of death changed. I make very limited use of the 1976 tax
reform, because I observe estates of individuals who died in 1977 only if they ﬁled in 1977, i.e. if the tax
return was ﬁled relatively quickly. This is then likely to be a selected sample. More details are in section 3.
9Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) includes all types of income subject to income tax as reported on the
tax return (wages and salaries, interest income, dividends, business income, capital gains etc.) less a few
(usually very small) adjustments to income.
4for married females (most likely, because data matching relied on primary ﬁler’s SSN only),
but even among widows it is still the case for 42% of the sample — possibly because their
husbands were still alive in 1969.10 As a result, incorporating women in the analysis is
diﬃcult both due to much smaller sample sizes and possible selection issues.
2.2 Length of illness measure
The key variable for the identiﬁcation strategy of this study is the length of terminal illness.
This information is available in the dataset as a categorical variable that takes ten values:
instantaneous (minutes), hours, 1 to 3 days, 4 to 7 days, 8 days to less than a month, 1
to 3 months, 4 to 6 months, 7 months or less than a year, 1 to 9 years and more than 10
years. I aggregate these values into three categories: “quick” (instantaneous), “medium”
(hours, days or weeks) and “long” (months or years),11 and study diﬀerences in behavior
across groups deﬁned by these categories.
Basic summary statistics by the length of terminal illness for the sample of married
males are shown in Table 1. Some variables vary with the length of illness. Those dying
instantaneously are younger than others. Such deaths are also less common in the 1977
subsample (as discussed below, it may be due to selection on the delay in ﬁling a return).
There is also a bit of a diﬀerence in income a few years earlier. This issue will be discussed
below. A few ﬁnancial variables appear quite diﬀerent across categories. There is some
diﬀerence in the size of net worth, stocks, bonds, real estate and life insurance. Strikingly,
there is a major diﬀerence in assets reported on the Schedule G — “lifetime transfers.”
Length of illness is based on response to the item #4 “Length of last illness” in the
“General Information” section of the estate tax return. There is no guarantee that this
question has always been answered accurately,12,13 so that one may worry about the quality
10Information about income tax return for 1974 is missing for 28% of widows.
11This aggregation helps in reducing the extent of misclassiﬁcation and keeping the number of reported
coeﬃcients manageable. Note that the distinction between immediate deaths and longer term illnesses
is likely to be much cleaner than between other categories. This motivates separating the instantaneous
category from any longer illness: it is likely to be dominated by unexpected events (ideally, from the
identiﬁcation point of view, it would reﬂect purely random accidents), while even a short-term terminal
illness may be the result of a known pre-existing condition. A misclassiﬁcation error will act against ﬁnding
an eﬀect. The results are noisier but robust to ﬁner measurement of the length of illness.
1216.2% of the sample does not contain an answer to this question at all. These individuals are more
commonly widowed, single or divorced and they are younger than average. There seem to be no selection
based on net worth or income. Inaccuracy would also likely be an issue in any survey data. HRS/AHEAD
includes an exit survey that contains such information, but it has few high-wealth individuals. In either case,
it is of course someone else (the executor of the estate in the estate tax case, a family member in surveys)
who responded to this question.
13One reason for misleading answers has to do with tax avoidance: transfers made in “anticipation of
death” had to be included in the estate and this could provide an incentive to hide a lengthy illness.
Transfers within three years of death were presumed to be in anticipation of death and the burden of proof
that it was otherwise fell on the taxpayer. If such transfers were present, the executor was required to
provide information about hospitals in which the taxpayer was conﬁned in the last three years of life. While
it is not possible to measure the extent of this problem, it acts against ﬁnding an eﬀect of the terminal
illness, because it shifts tax avoiders experiencing a large response to the non-treatment group.
5of this variable. In Table 2, I show how length of illness varies with age and gender.
Instantaneous deaths become less common with age and they are more common for men
than women, with the diﬀerence shrinking with age. This pattern seems reasonable and is
consistent with this variable containing information about the actual length of illness.
A more direct tests of the informativeness of this variable can be obtained by regressing
income a few years before death on the length of illness. Table 3 shows the results.14
The simple regression of 1969 AGI on the length of illness produces a perverse positive
coeﬃcient on the lengthy illness. Note though that this is actually consistent with the eﬀect
of truncation (only estates greater than $120,000 are observed) in the presence of an eﬀect
of illness on net worth: when those suﬀering from lengthy illness die with lower net worth,
some of them drop out of sample. Because wealth is strongly correlated with AGI, this
leads to eliminating from the sample some relatively low AGI individuals who suﬀered from
a lengthy illness, thereby increasing the truncated sample mean of AGI conditional on long
illness. Consistently with this story, the eﬀect disappears when the sample is restricted to
those with 1969 AGI greater than $50,000 — a subsample where truncation is less important.
When a similar exercise is repeated using 1974 AGI, estimates for the full sample are no
longer positive and the eﬀect of lengthy illness for the subsample of those with 1969 AGI
greater than $50,000 is large, negative and signiﬁcant. This suggests that individuals who
suﬀered from a long illness already experienced a drop in income as of 1974. Comfortingly,
the coeﬃcient on medium illness is very close to zero: such an illness should not yet have
had its onset as of 1974. The ﬁnal column reports the results of regressing the change in
AGI between 1969 and 1974 on the length of illness, while rudimentarily controlling for
truncation by including 1969 AGI in regression (this strategy is further discussed below).
This speciﬁcation again suggests that income fell by 1974 for those who suﬀered from a
lengthy illness. Overall, the fact that 1974 AGI responds to lengthy illness but 1969 AGI
does not is supportive of the length of illness containing real information. Furthermore, the
diﬀerence between results for full and restricted samples is suggestive of the presence of an
eﬀect of the length of illness on net worth that leads to selection eﬀect due to truncation.15
2.3 First stage — truncation
The econometric objective is to measure the impact of terminal illness on net worth and
other variables reported on tax returns. Denote by Wi the value of net worth of individual
i, by Di the indicator(s) of the length of terminal illness and by Xi values of any other
relevant control variables. I assume the following relationship:
ln(Wi) = γDi + βXi + εi (1)
14Third degree polynomial in age is included in all regressions but coeﬃcients are not reported in tables.
15When AGI was decomposed into available components, similar (albeit usually insigniﬁcant) eﬀects of
long illness were present for 1974 wages but not for wage in 1969 and not for dividends and interest income.
6and I am interested in estimating γ. Two econometric concerns need to be addressed. First,
Wi is observed only if an estate tax return is ﬁled. I observe (Wi,Di,Xi) only when:16
Wi > T (2)
where T is the threshold for inclusion in the sample (T is $120,000 for the whole sample but I
will also consider truncating the sample at higher thresholds). As a result, this is an example
of a truncated regression (the diﬀerence between this setup and a more common censored
regression is that here individuals with wealth below the threshold are not observed).
Directly comparing distributions of wealth under truncation is diﬃcult. A simple pro-
portional eﬀect may shift the conditional density at the truncation point up or down. One
can also show that it is possible for a factor to reduce wealth and yet for the average wealth
above the threshold to increase: some low wealth individuals then fall below the threshold
and are no longer used to construct the average net worth above it.17 Identiﬁcation in
problems with truncation is harder than in problems with censoring: the extra information
about the number of people who drop below the threshold available under censoring makes it
feasible to adjust for this eﬀect (see Powell, 1994, for a discussion). Such information is not
available (at least not directly) here: one does not know how many individuals with given
characteristics (critically, with the given length of illness) are located below the threshold.
Second, in general, the distribution of the error term εi is not known. If the shape of the
distribution was known, the maximum likelihood approach would be straightforward. It is
well known that the upper tail of the wealth (and income) distribution has “thick tail” and it
is usually well approximated by the Pareto distribution. When the set of regressors (Di,Xi)
includes only variables that are bounded (e.g. categorical variables such as gender or marital
status or variables with bounded support such as age), γDi +βXi must be bounded as well
and therefore thick tails of Wi must correspond to thick tails of εi. As a result, standard
approaches to Tobit-like models relying on normality or transformations to normality are
unlikely to be appropriate. Most of the observables belonging to speciﬁcation (1) are in
fact bounded. All variables with inﬁnite support observable on the estate tax return are
potentially related to Di and therefore should not be included. This is where the link
with income tax returns is crucial. I will include income a few years prior to death in
speciﬁcation (1). The idea is that conditional on income (that is known to have a distribution
with thick tails as well), estates may be more normally distributed. As a result, it is then
possible that the normality assumption is not severely violated, in particular γDi +βXi no
longer needs to be bounded because it includes regressors with full support.
This parametric assumption will be investigated further. The Pareto distribution could
be an alternative parametric candidate, but despite it being a good approximation for the
16The only variables not observable when Wi is below the threshold are Wi and Di. All Xi’s that I rely
on are present either on income tax return or in the CWHS. I do not use this source of information.
17A simple example illustrates it: consider a threshold of $120,000 and two individuals with net worth of
$130,000 and $270,000, respectively. The average net worth above $120,000 is equal to $200,000. Consider
a 10% decrease in net worth for both individuals. The ﬁrst individual falls below the threshold, making
the conditional net worth above the threshold equal to the net worth of the second person — $243,000: the
observed average net worth increases by more than 20% despite a 10% drop in net worth for everyone.
7tails of income and wealth distributions, there is no guarantee that it describes well the
overall distribution of the error terms conditional on regressors. In particular its validity
for the upper tail does not imply validity at lower wealth levels. Since maximum likelihood
estimates from the Tobit-style models are inconsistent when the distribution is mis-speciﬁed,
I consider semi-parametric techniques that impose weaker distributional assumptions.
A number of semi-parametric estimators have been proposed in the literature. I apply
Powell’s (1986) symmetrically censored LAD and symmetrically censored least squares to
make sure that my results are not driven by the parametric assumptions. These estimators
assume that the distribution of εi is symmetric. This is a weaker assumption than normal-
ity although it is not necessarily compatible with “thick tails.”18 These methods impose
artiﬁcial truncation from above to make the distribution of error terms in the sample used
in estimation symmetric. As a result, they eﬀectively rely only on a subset of observations.
The extent of this additional truncation depends on the variance of error terms and, as a
result, inclusion of additional regressors increases the number of eﬀectively used observa-
tions. Therefore, one should use them even if they could be omitted (i.e. when they are
orthogonal to other regressors). Thus, it turns out that inclusion of prior income is critical
also for the semi-parametric approaches even though it does not appear to be correlated
with the length of terminal illness.
Another possible approach is to estimate equation (1) on a subsample for which the
condition (2) always holds. In such a subsample equation (1) could be estimated by ordinary
least squares. Clearly, the required condition is the selection of a subsample in a way
unrelated to ε. I will rely on subsamples deﬁned using income in 1969. Given that net worth
at death is highly correlated with lifetime income, focusing on observations with high enough
income reduces (though does not eliminate) the incidence of truncation. Furthermore,
directly controlling for income in equation (1) deals with a concern about the selection bias
from this procedure. Results of the robustness analysis are reported in Appendix A.
There are three classes of reasons why net worth may vary with the length of illness.
First, there may be factors simultaneously aﬀecting net worth and the length of terminal
illness. An example of such a factor is age: net worth is likely a function of age in the
sample due to both cohort and life-cycle eﬀects. Observable factors of this kind can be
controlled for. Unobservable factors driving both the length of illness and pre-illness net
worth are a caveat to this analysis. The logarithm of 1969 income may be interpreted as
a measure of socio-economic status, thereby addressing the potential bias if the length of
illness and wealth were both driven by socio-economic factors varying within this sample.19
Second, attrition from the sample may be correlated with the length of illness. As an
example, suppose that individuals with net worth slightly above the ﬁling threshold (or
18Honore and Powell (1994) pairwise diﬀerenced LAD and least squares approach does not require sym-
metry but instead imposes independence of regressors therefore precluding heteroskedasticity. It is compu-
tationally intensive, with a naive algorithm requiring evaluation of the objective function for each pair of
observations (i.e., the computation cost of the order of n
2, for more than 10,000 observations used here it
requires evaluating 50 million terms). Details of an algorithm with the cost of n · log(n) are available from
the author, however even with that adjustment the approach turned out too computationally burdensome.
19As discussed above, income in 1969 and the ultimate length of illness do not appear to be related though.
8their families) do not realize that they are subject to the ﬁling requirement. If those who
get sick contact an estate planner, they may become informed and ﬁle a return even if they
otherwise would not. The diﬀerential extent of non-ﬁling cannot be directly tested, but it
should become less of an issue as one moves up in wealth distribution. Third, there may
be a direct causal relationship between net worth and the length of illness. The maintained
assumption is that it is the length of illness that causes net worth and not the other way
around.
2.4 Second stage — incidental truncation
Gaining insights into the nature of responses will involve analyzing information other than
net worth that is available on estate tax returns. Denote a particular variable of interest by
Yi. Examples of such variables are charitable contributions, various asset holdings (stocks,
bonds, life insurance, cash) and the amount of lifetime transfers. Yi is potentially aﬀected
by the length of terminal illness as well as being aﬀected by other control variables:
Yi = δDi + ψXi + ηi . (3)
The nature of the data again does not lend itself to a simple least squares approach. First,
as before, (Yi,Di,Xi) is only observed for individuals who ﬁle an estate tax return. There-
fore, the fully speciﬁed econometric framework should involve the three equations: (1), (2)
and (3). This setup is diﬀerent than the common Heckman-style selection problem. What is
observed is not just a binary selection indicator but the selection variable (Wi) itself. Such
a framework is known as “Tobit Type-3” or “incidental truncation” model. As pointed out
by Lee (1982) and Wooldridge (2002), observability of the determinant of selection has one
crucial advantage relative to the Heckman-style selection framework: identiﬁcation does not
require an exclusion restriction in equation 1. To see why, observe that the selection problem
is due to conditioning on W > T. When speciﬁcation 3 is conditioned on W > T, the error
term does not disappear but remains as E[η|X,D,W > T]. The standard two-step selection
correction amounts to constructing this nuisance term. In the binary-selection framework,
this construction relies on regressors from the ﬁrst stage and therefore identiﬁcation of (δ,ψ)
requires that at least one of the second-stage regressors does not underlie the construction
of the correction term (unless one is willing to rely on nonlinearity of the correction term).
With a Tobit-style selection equation (either censored or truncated), the observable selec-
tion indicator provides an extra source of variation that allows for an additional degree of
freedom in the selection correction procedure and thus it allows identiﬁcation of the param-
eter of interest without an exclusion restriction (see Wooldridge, 2002, page 572). This is
very convenient, because there is no natural exclusion restriction here.
In the main approach relied on in this paper, it is assumed that E[η|D,X,W] = αε.
A suﬃcient condition is that (ε,η) are jointly normal, but it is a weaker requirement than
that. If that this is the case, the conditional mean E[Y |D,X,W] is given by δD+ψX +αε.
Although ε is not observed, it can be consistently estimated using the truncated regression
approach and this estimate of the residual can be used in the second stage in place of ε.
This estimate varies independently of X and D because of its dependence on W. Note
9that while the ﬁrst stage estimation assumes normality, the second stage only requires the
assumption that the conditional mean of η on regressors is linear in ε.
I also consider relaxing the parametric assumptions. I rely on three semi-parametric
methods. Chen (1997) and Honore et al. (1997) proposed two-stage estimators for Tobit
Type-3 models. First, the truncated or censored selection model is estimated. I will rely on
the symmetrically censored least squares estimator. In the second stage, one of the Chen
(1997) estimators (referred to as “Chen #1”) and the Honore et al. (1997) estimator use
sample restricted so that the selection term is constant.20 The other of the Chen (1997)
estimators (“Chen #2”) amounts to a non-parametric construction of the residual term. Its
advantage is that it eﬀectively brings into estimation all of the observations.
I construct standard errors by bootstrapping the whole two-step procedure 1000 times.
The ﬁnal issue concerns the functional form speciﬁcation. I use logarithms of net worth
and AGI. This approach reduces the inﬂuence of outliers and makes it easier to assume
homoskedasticity, which is implicit in a normal truncated regression. In the second stage,
some variables involve a non-trivial number of observations with zero values. To incorporate
them, I considered four approaches. First, in my main approach, I use the logarithm of one
plus the dollar amount. Second, for variables that have a signiﬁcant number of observations
at zero, I assume normality and run a tobit on the whole sample using logarithms of the
dependent variable censored at $1000.21,22 Third, I take the share in net worth as the
dependent variable. Fourth, I run a linear probability model for the presence of the asset.
3 The eﬀect of illness on net worth
I begin with OLS that ignores truncation. Such results are biased toward the opposite
sign and thus provide the lower bound for the extent of decrease in net worth due to longer
illness. As shown in the ﬁrst two columns of Table 4a, the simple regression yields a negative
and signiﬁcant eﬀect of the length of illness on the size of net worth. The estimated eﬀect is
5 to 6.5% decrease in response to a long terminal illness, depending on whether 1969 AGI
20The Chen #1 estimator uses only observations that in the ﬁrst stage were lying above the regression
line and for which the truncation point is below the estimated regression line. If the distribution of error
terms conditional on observables is independent of observables, the selection term is then constant in this
subset. Honore et al. (1997) rely on symmetric trimming to guarantee the same condition. Their estimator
is consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity as long as the distribution remains symmetric.
21The $1000 threshold is chosen arbitrarily. For almost all variables there are very few observations with
values between $0 and $1000.
22The advantage of the ﬁrst approach is that it makes no additional assumptions about the second stage
error terms. In the absence of a response on the extensive margin (the presence of an asset), it has a similar
interpretation as the standard logarithmic speciﬁcation. Otherwise, it also accounts for the response on the
extensive margin. Given that such a response involves a change from the logarithm of the actual dollar
value to zero, while the response on the intensive margin is approximately equal to a percentage change, the
extensive margin response can be measured as large even though dollar amounts are small. This potentially
large weight put on the extensive response must be taken into account while interpreting these estimates.
The results from the Tobit approach have the standard interpretation, but it assumes normality in the
second stage. In practice, results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar, suggesting that the response
on the extensive margin does not aﬀect the ﬁrst approach in a major way.
10is controlled for. These and all subsequent speciﬁcations include also a third degree age
polynomial and a dummy for dying after 1976.
The second approach is the truncated regression model assuming normality and esti-
mated using maximum likelihood. The results with and without controlling for 1969 AGI
are shown in the second panel of Table 4a. They show a stronger eﬀect of net worth than
in the case of OLS. When previous AGI is controlled for, the estimated eﬀect of the lengthy
terminal illness is −.18 and it is also negative (−0.11) for the medium term illness.
The results also show that controlling for 1969 AGI plays a signiﬁcant role. The eﬀect
of a lengthy terminal illness without controlling for the 1969 income is −.411 and the eﬀect
of the middle-length illness is then −.219 — these estimates are twice as big as the ones
obtained when 1969 AGI is controlled for. What is the explanation of the role that AGI
plays? There could be two possible reasons. It is possible that the length of illness is related
to income. If that is the case, permanent income would be a joint determinant of net worth
and the length of illness. This would be a reason for having 1969 AGI as a control but it
would also be discomforting, because 1969 AGI is at best a noisy measure of permanent
income making it diﬃcult to argue that all such inﬂuences are controlled for. Second, 1969
AGI may be relevant because its inclusion changes the distribution of the error term and
the distributional assumption is embedded in the estimation method. As shown in Table 4a
the latter is most likely the case: when the length of illness variables are excluded, the
coeﬃcient on the 1969 AGI does not change, suggesting no relationship between the length
of illness and prior income. Since inclusion of AGI aﬀects estimated coeﬃcients in the
truncated regression speciﬁcation, it indicates that this variable plays an important role in
aﬀecting the shape of the distribution of the error term.
Credibility of the truncated regression estimates rests on the credibility of the distribu-
tional assumption regarding the error term. As argued before, when net worth is studied
the normality assumption is plausible when one conditions on income but not otherwise.
The results based on the truncated regression with 1969 AGI are the preferred speciﬁcation.
Results are robust to other approaches to truncation, details are presented in Appendix A.
Table 4b shows the results using diﬀerent truncation thresholds for net worth: $250,000,
$500,000 and $1 million. The purpose of this exercise is to evaluate the possibility of
heterogeneous responses for diﬀerent net worth categories. These results are quite stable.
In particular, the normality-based truncated regression with either $250,000 or $500,000
threshold are only a little bit weaker than the results for everyone above $120,000. Estimates
for those above $1 million are weaker and insigniﬁcant (but the sample is much smaller)
although still negative. The last two columns are based on the sample is artiﬁcially truncated
from above, while accounting for this second layer of truncation in the likelihood function.
The results indeed appear to become weaker as net worth increases, although they remain
negative. One interpretation consistent with these results is that individuals with larger
net worth have done more planning beforehand so that less needs to be done shortly before
death. Another possibility is that inducing the same proportional change in a large fortune
shortly before death is harder than in a small one.
In the following table, Table 4c, the sample is split between the pre- and post-1976 data.
11As discussed before, most of the observations correspond to deaths before 1977, but there are
also some observations for 1977. Taxation of estates changed in 1977: marital deduction was
extended to cover at least $250,000 (or 50% of adjusted gross estate, whichever was greater)
and the tax exempt amount was also increased. The extension of marital deduction was
particularly important and the number of non-taxable estates among married males with
net worth greater than $120,000 increased from 5.4% among pre-1977 deaths to 72.4% in
1977 (though the marginal tax rate for non-spousal transfers often remained positive). As
a result, it is likely that individuals dying post 1976 behave diﬀerently than those who died
earlier. The ﬁrst panel of Table 4c shows results for the pre-1977 population, while the
second panel shows results for 1977 decedents. Results prior to 1977 are very consistent
with previous conclusions, in fact they are even somewhat stronger. Estimates for 1977
tend to be insigniﬁcant. The disappearance of response after 1976 is consistent with 1977
decedents pursuing less planning following the onset of a terminal illness due to weaker tax
incentives to do so.
The caveat to the interpretation of the diﬀerence in results for the pre-1977 and the
1977 data is non-random sample selection. Individuals who died in 1977 are in the sample
if their tax returns were ﬁled in 1977 and not later. It may be that early ﬁlers are simply
good planners and therefore there is no response. Alternatively, more complicated estates
with higher net worth may be ﬁled late but this eﬀect might be weaker in situations when
death was expected and signiﬁcant planning has already taken place. In fact, in the pre-
1977 population, 21.1% of individuals were reported as having died within hours while the
corresponding number for post-1976 population is 17.8%. The gap increases to 4.9% for
those with net worth above $1 million.23 Whether this gap is due to selection or whether
it reﬂects a response of estates to the length of terminal illness24 is however non-testable.
The potential sample selection problem makes it diﬃcult to study the eﬀect of the 1976 tax
reform using this dataset and it is the reason for using the whole sample in the bulk of the
analysis here. Because the pre-1977 sample also suﬀers from the sample selection problem
due to under-representation of “quick ﬁlers”, the potential response to the 1976 Act that
varied systematically with the length of terminal illness and occurred within a few months
of its implementation remains a caveat to the analysis.
Table 4d shows results from a truncated regression speciﬁcation for groups other than
married males. As mentioned before, there are two problems with studying other groups.
First, there is selection due to the fact that 1969 AGI is available only for a small number
of women — predominantly those who have already been widowed as of 1969. Second, the
number of observations is smaller. This is the result of the AGI issue for widowed women,
the sheer number being small for widowed males and both reasons for married women. I
231977 estates are smaller on average: for married males with net worth above $120,000, the average estate
for those dying prior to 1977 is $332,465 while for those dying in 1977 it is just $280,608. Between 1976
and 1977 the inﬂation rate was 6%, real GDP increased by 4.5% and the S&P 500 fell by about 4%. The
average age of 1977 decedents is 70.9 years, more than two years higher than for the rest of the sample.
24This gap is of course consistent with a stronger response of estate planning to length of illness in 1976
than in 1977. This is because individuals suﬀering from a long terminal illness should then drop out of the
pre-1977 sample thereby increasing the incidence of a short terminal illness.
12show results for both the full sample and those with estates over $500,000. There is evidence
of a strong response to the length of terminal illness, with the exception for the wealthy
widowed women. First, there is a very strong eﬀect for married females, much stronger
than that observed for married males. Despite the small number of observations and large
standard errors, it is reaching statistical signiﬁcance for the lengthy illness and it is also
signiﬁcant in the full sample at 10% level for the medium length illness. The eﬀect for
widowed males is very close to that estimated for married males and is again signiﬁcant for
the lengthy illness. There appears to be a smaller but negative eﬀect for widowed females
in the full sample but it disappears in the high net worth group.
It was assumed so far that the eﬀect of terminal illness does not vary with age. There are
reasons why it could. If the response reﬂects last minute planning in reaction to a negative
health shock, it should be more important for those who have not undertaken suitable estate
planning before — presumably, these are predominantly younger individuals. In order to
consider this possibility, I ﬁrst allow for the eﬀect of terminal illness to vary with age.
Speciﬁcally, I include an interaction of the terminal illness dummies with age minus 70
years (roughly the mean age in the sample). As a result, coeﬃcients on illness dummies
now reﬂect the eﬀect for those who are exactly 70 and the interaction coeﬃcient reﬂects
the additional/reduced eﬀect for an extra year of distance from age of 70. These results
are presented in Table 5, for both wage and AGI controls. The estimated eﬀects at 70
are similar as when no age-dependent eﬀect was allowed, but there is also evidence that
the eﬀect falls with age — both interaction coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant. The presence of
an age-dependent eﬀect can be further investigated by splitting the sample into diﬀerent
age categories (cf. the following columns of Table 5). The eﬀects are by far the strongest
for those younger than 60, both for the lengthy and medium-term terminal illnesses. The
estimated coeﬃcient on the long illness in this age category is −.35 suggesting that about
35% of net worth evaporates following the onset of terminal illness in this younger group.
The corresponding estimates for the older categories are of the order of −.13 (although
the eﬀect for those over 80 is not signiﬁcant). Overall these results are supportive of the
presence of an eﬀect for all groups, but with its importance falling with age.
In conclusion, results indicate that net worth as reported on tax returns fell in response
to a prolonged terminal illness. The eﬀect for illness that lasted months or years is of the
order of 10 to 20%, and it appears to be fairly robust across diﬀerent wealth categories. The
impact of illness lasting days to weeks was not always signiﬁcant but it was very consistently
negative and of the order of 5 to 10%. This latter category may include individuals who
were sickly for much longer, with just the ﬁnal onset lasting weeks or days. More likely, the
response represents tax planning that takes place within a month of death. Results obtained
by splitting the sample around the 1976 tax reform provide evidence consistent with tax
planning. Results for diﬀerent age categories are also suggestive of planning, although they
do not necessarily require a tax motive. The response being even stronger for married
women is suggestive of a last-minute planning, given that the wife dying ﬁrst is likely to
be a surprise. There seems to be asymmetry in the response of widowed males and females
possibly representing gender diﬀerences in attitudes toward planning.
134 The source of response
In the previous section, it was demonstrated that net worth at death as reported on estate
tax return responds to the indicator of the length of terminal illness. The next step is to
understand the mechanism behind this response. The following discussion will be governed
by two objectives. First, we would like to establish to what extent the response reﬂects
planning and to what extent it reﬂects a real response of net worth. If there is evidence of a
real drop in wealth, it is important to understand its source (e.g., medical expenditures, lost
income). Second, we would like to discriminate between tax motivations and other reasons
for adjustments such as controlling how resources are used after one’s death.
A part of my strategy is to see which of the items reported on tax returns do respond.
Here again, truncation is a problem. Although variables other net worth are not directly
truncated, they are observed only if net worth is above the threshold. As before, for
reference, I will present the results from OLS regressions, followed by a parametric approach
for the whole sample and those with net worth above $500,000. The parametric approach
relies on the truncated regression model discussed earlier and a second stage with the
determinant of selection controlled for. Appendix Table A.2 shows results based on semi-
parametric methods.25 Finally, I will refer to outside sources of information where relevant.
Lost income One possible explanation for the drop of wealth following the onset of a
terminal illness is lost income. The following back-of-the envelope calculation suggests that
it may be relevant: the average adjusted gross income in 1974 was $30,000 while the average
net worth at death was approximately $330,000. Thus, disappearance of one year’s income
could potentially result in a reduction in net worth on the order of 10%. What would be
required for this eﬀect to explain all of the ﬁndings is the loss of one-year of income in the
case of medium-length illness and two years of income for the lengthy illness — given that
the medium-length illness category corresponds to illnesses lasting less than a month, while
the long illness category corresponds to illnesses lasting one month or more, it seems that
lost income is unlikely to account for the whole eﬀect but it may still have played a role.
Income reported on the tax return includes not only employment-related income, but
also many categories of capital income. Wages and salaries constitute at most 40% of
income (depending on whether 1969 or 1974 data are used and depending on the length-
of-illness category, see Table 1). At least 20% of income is accounted for by dividends and
interest. Given that much of the population had already been past the retirement age as
of 1969, capital income is likely to constitute much of the remainder.26 In fact, there is
indirect evidence that this must be the case: the estimated coeﬃcient on the 1969 AGI
in the baseline speciﬁcation (and many others) is remarkably close to one. This is very
suggestive of the AGI simply reﬂecting the return on accumulated wealth.27 If so, one may
25Semi-parametric results are shown for the full sample only. This is because they eﬀectively rely on a
small subset of data and therefore tend to be noisy in smaller samples.
26Neither self-employment income nor the amount of capital gains is available in the data. The indicator
for the presence of capital gains is available for 1974, 62% of returns used in the analysis have capital gains.
27If AGI = r·Net Worth, with r stochastic but independent of net worth, the coeﬃcient from the regression
14expect that the loss of ability to work should result in a drop in wealth much smaller than
the corresponding AGI numbers would indicate.
More formal evidence is presented in Table 6. The ﬁrst column shows that AGI as of
1974 does respond to the long illness. The following columns indicate that wages in 1974
are also potentially responding to the length of illness (coeﬃcients are negative though
insigniﬁcant) and that income other than wages or dividends and interest is also negatively
responding.28 To assess the quantitative impact of such eﬀects, I add the log of 1974 AGI
to the baseline regression. By doing so, the coeﬃcients on the length of illness should
be reduced by any eﬀect of illness correlated with the 1974 AGI. There is evidence that
the eﬀect is somewhat attenuated: the eﬀect of the medium term illness falls from −.106
in the baseline speciﬁcation to −0.078, while the eﬀect of the long-term illness falls from
−.181 to −.134. These changes are not statistically signiﬁcant, but it suggests that a loss
of income might have played a role in the drop in wealth. However, any reason for the
negative correlation of the drop in AGI between 1969 and 1974 and the length of illness
would reduce these coeﬃcients when 1974 income is included. One possibility has to do
with tax planning. Given the step-up in basis at death, taxpayers have a tax incentive to
postpone realization of capital gains until death. In particular, they would have had an
incentive not to realize capital gains following the onset of a terminal illness. As a result,
this ﬁnding is also consistent with the existence of tax planning. To shed a light on this
issue, I control for 1974 wages rather than the AGI and I ﬁnd that there is no longer any
evidence of a reduction in estimates. The results are very similar when I additionally control
for 1969 wages, thereby eﬀectively allowing for a change in wages between 1969 and 1974 to
enter the regression. This is inconsistent with the loss of income story, because a reduction
in wages is the most natural manifestation of such an eﬀect. Therefore, I conclude that the
relationship of the length of illness with the drop in AGI in 1974 is most likely due to (tax)
planning rather than a real drop in income, and this approach does not support the notion
that a loss of income played a quantitatively important role in the drop of net worth.
An alternative approach is to interact prior (i.e., as of 1969) income with the length of
illness. If the drop in wealth was really due to income loss, then, ceteris paribus, those with
higher income should be more aﬀected by a lengthy illness. I ﬁrst allow for the eﬀect of illness
to vary with the size of the AGI and ﬁnd no support for the eﬀect of this kind (penultimate
speciﬁcation in Table 6). Estimates have signs inconsistent with this hypothesis: those
with higher AGI experienced a lower drop in net worth (estimates are insigniﬁcant though).
Given that AGI includes a large share of capital income that is unlikely to drop following
the onset of illness, in the last speciﬁcation I allow for the eﬀect of the length of illness to
vary with wages instead and I also ﬁnd that these interactions are insigniﬁcant.
Concluding, there is no support that lost income is a quantitatively important explana-
tion for the drop in net worth documented before.
of the logarithm of net worth on the logarithm of AGI should be equal to one.
28Dividend and interest income is not aﬀected by the length of illness (not reported).
15The relevance of end-of-life expenditures Another possible source of the eﬀect on net
worth could be spending that occurs shortly before death. It is possible that medical and
other health-related expenses shortly before death increase. The data do not contain direct
information about end-of-life expenditures. It does contain information about funeral and
administrative expenses as well as information about debts, both of which may be related
to end-of-life spending. These variables will be discussed later. Given no direct information
about end-of-life spending, it is informative to consult alternative sources to gauge whether
it is likely that the eﬀect on net worth that was identiﬁed reﬂects such spending.
The magnitude of health-related spending will depend on the presence of health insur-
ance. I am not aware of a source of information about health insurance among the wealthy
for the mid-1970s. The Survey of Consumer Finances is, however, available for 1983 and
it contains the necessary questions. Among households with net worth exceeding $210,000
of 1983 dollars (which approximately corresponds to $120,000 in 1976), 95% had health
insurance. The corresponding number for those below the age of 65 is 96%, while it is
91% for those 65 or older. Most individuals in the latter group were likely eligible for
Medicare. The extent of health coverage among those younger 65 did not vary much with
the type of employment: self-employed reported the insurance rate of 95%, the lowest rate
(of 92%) was for employees of private ﬁrms with less than 100 employees. Weighting by
1983 mortality rates to closer resemble the decedent population makes the likelihood of not
having health insurance among non-Medicare eligible population even lower. Therefore, the
wealthy population does not seem to be particularly vulnerable to high medical costs.
More direct information about the end-of-life spending is available from the Health
and Retirement Survey (as well as AHEAD) that contains an “exit” stage that applies to
participants of the prior waves who have died since. The results of the exit survey provide
more direct information about the end-of-life expenses as well as information about the
length of terminal illness. The drawback of this data is that they apply to the 1990s (the ﬁrst
exit survey is available in 1995) and that there are relatively few wealthy individuals, thereby
making it diﬃcult to study the top of the distribution. Still, these data are informative for
understanding how end-of-life expenses change with the length of illness, age and wealth
and for understanding whether their magnitude may explain the results.
I combined the exit surveys (i.e., surveys of families of those who have died between the
waves of the survey) from 1995 AHEAD and 1996, 1998 and 2000 waves of HRS. There are
3612 individuals in this sample but only 303 of them had estates that exceed $120,000 in
1976 dollars. Of this group, 134 individuals were married males. The end of life expenses
were deﬁned as the sum of out of pocket spending in the last two years of life on hospitals
and nursing home stays, hospices, doctor bills, in-home medical care, special facilities or
services, prescriptions29 and other out-of-pocket expenses.30 I deﬁned the value of estate
29The question about out-of-pocket prescription costs was asked in terms of the average monthly spending
of this kind in the last two years of life. Some answers to this question were of the order of a few thousand
dollars, possibly reﬂecting total rather than average spending. Nevertheless, I take them at face value and
multiply by 24 to arrive at the ﬁnal ﬁgure. These results are therefore likely to be an overestimate.
30The wording of the question about other out-of-pocket expenses suggested including anything health-
related that was not previously listed.
16as the sum of reported estate, life insurance, out of pocket expenses and funeral costs. The
intention was to arrive at a number comparable to the estate reported on the tax return,
but without a reduction for medical and funeral costs in order to see the extent to which
they matter. I also classiﬁed the reported length of terminal illness in the three length
categories in the same manner as was done for the estate tax data. I concentrated on the
fraction of the end-of-life expenses in the estate in order to make the magnitude of these
numbers easily comparable to the estimates from the logarithmic speciﬁcation.
The average share of end-of-life expenses in the estate for the whole sample was 12.4%
without funeral expenses and 45.5% when funeral expenses were included. For those with
estates greater than $120,000 (of 1976 dollars), the corresponding numbers were just 1.3%
and 2.8%. The total end-of-life expenses are not very sensitive to wealth: the average for
those with estates below $120,000 is $4000 and it is $6700 (all numbers in 1976 dollars)
among the wealthy group, despite an increase in the average size of estate by the factor
of 35. While these are undoubtedly signiﬁcant expenses for most of the population (to
arrive at the current dollars they need to be multiplied by a factor of about three), they
are quite small for the wealthy. These numbers may still mask heterogeneity by length of
terminal illness. Indeed (again for those with estates above $120,000), non-funeral end-of-
life medical expenses were 0.2% for those dying immediately, while they were 1.6% and 1.3%
for those with illnesses classiﬁed as medium or long, respectively. With funeral expenses
accounted for, these numbers increase to 1.5%, 3% and 2.8% respectively. When the sample
is restricted to married males conclusions are very similar. Medical expenses due to a
medium or long illness are 1.3% and 1.2% respectively (they are slightly lower than the
average for the whole group, consistently with the possibility that a lot of care for married
males was provided by spouses). The end-of-life expenses with funeral costs accounted for
are 1.4% for instantaneous deaths, 2.6% for medium length and 3% for lengthy illnesses.
The number of wealthy individuals in AHEAD/HRS is small and these surveys by design
did not include young individuals. Hence, the analysis of the wealth gradient with respect
to illness by age categories diﬃcult. To get some idea of the importance of age, I split
the sample into two categories: those below the age of 75 (40 married males) and those
above that age (86 married males). Medical costs associated with a lengthy illness for the
“young” individuals were 1.8% on average and they were 0.9% for the older group. When
funeral expenses were accounted for, these costs were 4% for the younger group and 2.6%
for the older one. The medical costs for the instantaneous category were zero in all cases
and funeral expenses were 1.8% for the younger group and 1.0% for the older one.
Overall, this suggests that a lengthy illness was more costly for younger individuals, but
there is no evidence that these costs were even remotely close to the numbers estimated in
the estate tax sample. These numbers show a bit of a gradient in medical expenses with
respect to the length of illness in the wealthy category, but the eﬀect is of the order of 1 to
2%. Even the most generous interpretation under which funeral expenses are paid out of
(and deducted) from the reported estate when illness is instantaneous and they are pre-paid
when it is not would not produce numbers greater than 4% as the eﬀect of terminal illness.
Other than being from a diﬀerent period than the estate tax data analyzed in this paper,
17a few additional caveats apply. First, values of estates reported in the survey data are likely
higher than the value of estates reported on the tax returns. By making the denominator
larger, this eﬀect reduces the importance of end-of-life expenses. However, the inclusion in
the wealthy sample depends on estate being larger than a threshold and given low sensitivity
of end-of-life expenses to wealth this eﬀect would oﬀset the former one. In fact, when the
same calculations were repeated with all estates reduced by 30%, the average share of end-
of-life expenses for those with the reduced estate above $120,000 of 1976 dollars was in each
case within .2% of the previous results. Second, one may expect that survey responses to
the question about the length of terminal illness may be of higher quality than answers on
the estate tax return. If so, end-of-life expenses in AHEAD/HRS should show a steeper
gradient by the length of illness than the corresponding eﬀect estimated from the estate tax
data. Therefore, the lack of a strong gradient in the survey data makes it unlikely that it
drives the estimated drop in estates. Third, survey data contains a noisy measure of the
end-of-life expenses, though neither the presence nor the direction of the bias is obvious.
I conclude that it is very unlikely that end-of-life expenditures could explain the drop
in net worth, because they are an order of magnitude lower than the estimated eﬀects.
Contrary to my estimates, the end-of-life expenditures also don’t show a steep age gradient
and their importance appears to be signiﬁcantly falling with wealth, inconsistently with the
stability of estimates by wealth categories.
Precautionary saving In order to understand the source of responses I turn next to
other information observable on tax returns. Another potential explanation for the drop in
wealth can be the presence of a strong precautionary motive. The idea is that individuals do
not have a desire to hold on to wealth by itself and they do not have a strong desire to leave
a bequest, but rather they save to insure themselves against adverse income realizations
or consequences of health shocks. It is by now well established that precautionary motive
works fairly well as an explanation of wealth holding for most of the population (see for
example Hubbard et al., 1995; Dynan et al., 2002; Scholz et al., 2006). Some authors
observed, however, that this model does not appear to be explaining well the upper tail of
the wealth distribution (Scholz et al., 2006; De Nardi, 2004).31
Top wealth-holders leave behind fortunes that could not have been consumed in a real-
istic lifetime and with realistic consumption patterns (Carroll, 2000). Still, for the sake of
argument, suppose that wealth holdings of the rich considered here were in fact driven by
precautionary motivations with no independent bequest or wealth motivations. A drop in
wealth following the onset of a terminal illness could then correspond to a number of eﬀects.
It could reﬂect medical expenses or it could reﬂect lost income. As discussed above these
possibilities have little support in the data. Second, it could reﬂect a reallocation of con-
31Scholz et al. (2006) ﬁnd that the life-cycle model is not able to explain wealth at the top of the distribution
even though it ﬁts the rest of the distribution remarkably well. The extent of discrepancy seems to be related
to subjective bequest probabilities. Kopczuk and Lupton (2006) model wealth distribution as a mixture of
life-cycle savers and bequeathers, and ﬁnd support for the presence of a bequest motive. Their estimates
imply that the bequest motive accounts for as much as 50% of the ultimately bequeathed wealth, driven by
the very top of the distribution. Its quantitative implications at low levels of wealth are negligible though.
18sumption in response to an increase in the eﬀective discount rate occurring when mortality
risk rises. While it may not be easily dismissed using this data, it is hard to believe that
people go on spending binges on their deathbeds. As will be discussed in a little bit more
detail below, one prediction of such a behavior should be an increase in “consumption”
goods observed on the estate tax return (such as funeral spending) and also an increase in
debts. Previewing this discussion, there is no support in the data for either.
An additional piece of evidence is presented on Figure 1 that shows the estimated age
proﬁle based on the baseline regression presented in Table 4a, but with single-year age
eﬀect rather a polynomial in age (the estimated coeﬃcient on the medium-term illness is
−.10 and the coeﬃcient on the long-term illness is −.17).32,33 The graph shows estimated
age coeﬃcients and two-times-standard-error bands. The average value of the age eﬀect
for people in their 50s is −0.82 while the average value for people in their nineties is 0.32,
corresponding to an increase of 214% or 2.9% per year (over 40 years).
It should be stressed that these are cross-sectional results. For one thing, they cannot
distinguish between cohort and age eﬀects, but it is natural to expect that the cohort (i.e.,
year-of-birth) eﬀects were growing over time with economic development and, therefore,
that the estimated slope of the age-proﬁle is downward-biased. Similarly, tax avoidance is
likely to increase with age, hence providing another source of downward bias. If longevity
is inﬂuenced by wealth or both are inﬂuenced by a third factor, it would contribute to
the presence of an increasing age proﬁle. For it to be the case, the eﬀect would have to
be present within the group of the wealthy and the magnitude of such an eﬀect would
have to be large to explain the 3% increase in wealth associated with an extra year of
life. Furthermore, such selection eﬀects would have to continue (or even strengthen) until
very old age to explain the continuing increase in wealth. This is not very likely.34 Also,
selection on mortality would have to be present conditional on AGI that’s controlled for
here. These cross-sectional patterns suggest that net worth is increasing with age up until
age of 98. Taken at face value, these patterns would be hard to explain using the standard
pure life-cycle model, whether it includes signiﬁcant uncertainty and thereby precautionary
motive or not. A possibility of this kind that cannot be easily dismissed is the “peso”
problem where individuals save for an event that may occur with very low probability (such
as ﬁnancing a “miracle cure”), possibly even never occurring in a ﬁnite sample. This kind
of motive is hard to distinguish from utility from holding on to wealth and it is probably
better thought of as an example of it rather than a more standard precautionary motive.
32This truncated regression is conditional on adjusted gross income in 1969 as elsewhere in the paper. The
truncated regression without controlling for income shows an even stronger increasing age proﬁle but the
assumption of normality of the error terms is unrealistic in that case. One way of interpreting these results
is as reﬂecting pure accumulation of pre-existing wealth stock with any new savings out of income controlled
for by the AGI. The upward sloping pattern is also present in the simple OLS (although not as steep).
33These results are based on the truncated regression speciﬁcation that assumes normality and ho-
moskedasticity of error terms. The age proﬁles based on semi-parametric speciﬁcations that only assume
symmetry of the distribution of error terms and allow for heteroskedasticity show a very similar pattern.
34An appendix to the NBER working paper version of this work contains calculations indicating that even
as much as halving the mortality rates in response to doubling wealth within the sample of the wealthy would
not be enough to produce this pattern.
19Subject to caveats related to wealth-mortality gradient, Figure 1 casts doubt on whether
consumption considerations are important for wealth accumulation of the rich. Instead,
what one needs is a framework that allows for the utility from wealth or the utility from
bequests or both. The message of this paper is that both are necessary to make sense of
the data.
Lifetime transfers and taxable gifts. Lifetime transfers that occurred in anticipation
of death or that were incomplete in the sense of decedent retaining some control over assets
(such as e.g., veto power) are subject to estate taxation and reported on Schedule G —
“Transfers During Decedent’s Life” — attached to the return. Prior to 1977, transfers of
property made within three years of death were assumed to be in contemplation of death and
were subject to taxation (McCubbin, 1994; Luckey, 1995). Schedule G also includes transfers
that were not intended to take place until death or those for inadequate consideration.
Schedule G does not by itself represent tax avoidance and assets reported on it are
subject to the same tax treatment as assets reported elsewhere on the tax return. While
such transfers occur prior to death of the taxpayer, they remain subject to the estate tax as
an anti-avoidance measure. Their presence does, however, reﬂect that active planning for
the disposition of estate took place. Furthermore, as discussed in footnote 35 below, tax
motivated adjustments shortly before death are likely to increase the size of Schedule G as
a by-product. An estate of an individual who pursues any planning following the onset of
a terminal illness would therefore most likely show a response on Schedule G.
Summary statistics reported in Table 1 are suggestive of the presence of a response: the
average size of Schedule G and the fraction of estates with this schedule are approximately
80% larger among those who suﬀered from a lengthy illness relative to those who died
instantaneously. I investigate more formally the eﬀect of illness on transfers reported on
Schedule G in Table 7. I analyze the value of Schedule G, its presence and its share in total
net worth. The simple OLS speciﬁcation reveals a relationship between the size, presence
and share of Schedule G and the length of terminal illness. Controlling for incidental
truncation turns out to be important — the selection term (residual from the ﬁrst stage)
is highly signiﬁcant in each case — but it has little impact on the eﬀect of terminal illness
(although it does aﬀect the estimates of the impact of prior income). Estimates are very
similar for both the full sample and when the sample is limited to those with net worth
greater than $500,000. The results also turn out to be robust to semi-parametric approaches
to correcting for the incidental truncation problem presented in Table A.2. The eﬀect of
illness on Schedule G is also clearly visible in the linear probability models of the presence of
Schedule G and when the share of Schedule G in the total net worth is used as a dependent
variable. There is robust evidence of transfers qualifying for Schedule G being extensively
made following the onset of terminal illness.
By itself, the presence of this kind of response demonstrates that taxpayers are actively
responding to the signal about their mortality. Arguably, evidence of increased sheltering
provides support simultaneously for enjoyment of wealth and bequest motivation. The
presence of this type of a response demonstrates that the planning horizon is in fact longer
20than the lifetime. There is no reason to engage in these types of transfers if the person was
driven by life-cycle considerations only. Similarly, it is also inconsistent with the pure wealth
as status model (Carroll, 2000), although evidence of a major increase in Schedule G assets
is consistent with the possibility that taxpayers have a hard time parting with their assets
before death (despite having a longer horizon). Evidence of the presence of this type of
response provides a weak indication of the importance of non-tax motives. These transfers
are still subject to taxation. Therefore, superﬁcially, one may be tempted to conclude that
they must be driven by non-tax considerations. However, legal tax avoidance that involves
transfers to others shortly before or at death in many cases would leave a trace on the
Schedule G.35 Furthermore, since the presumption that gifts were made in anticipation of
death can be challenged, one might have chosen to make a a transfer shortly before death
counting on its exclusion from estate. Given that this strategy may be successful, one would
expect it should be pursued and therefore that Schedule G should respond.36
An obvious place to look for evidence of attempts to exploit diﬀerential tax treatment of
gifts and estates are taxable gifts. Unfortunately, since gift and estate taxes were operated
independently prior to 1977, the data do not contain information on the size of taxable
gifts. It does contain though an indicator for the presence of a gift tax return. The problem
with this variable for the purpose of studying estate tax planning is that it does not respond
to giving by individuals who had made taxable gifts in the past. It is, however, the only
measure available in the data. In the last panel of table 7, I regress this indicator on the
length of terminal illness. It has been argued (McGarry, 1999; Poterba, 2001) that potential
estate taxpayers do not take advantage of the annual exemptions from gift taxation and
tax-preferred treatment of gifts. Joulfaian (2004) has demonstrated though that giving is
very responsive to tax considerations by showing a very strong increase of taxable gifts in
1976, in response to a gift tax increase embedded in the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
There is no evidence of a response of gifts following the onset of a terminal illness. If
35Many trust instruments involve a transfer from the taxpayer to the trust. A popular example is an
irrevocable life insurance trust that is intended to exclude the proceeds of a policy from the estate. Private
annuities discussed by Cooper (1979) may involve a transfer if not fairly priced. Disposing of stocks by a
majority shareholder at or before death, in order to reduce holdings to a minority position and therefore
qualify for a minority discount may involve a direct transfer. A transfer of an asset to a family limited
partnership in exchange for a minority interest (with associated minority discount, see Schmalbeck, 2001,
p. 133, for an example) and retained right to interest or use would be included on Schedule G. Proceeds of
buy-out agreements to be executed at death (popular at that time Kahn, 1969) may also have been reported
on Schedule G. A non-estate tax reason for Schedule-G transfers may be an attempt to avoid probate.
36This presumption could be challenged by showing that the gift was motivated by lifetime considerations
and it was modiﬁed by the 1976 Act to automatically include such gifts in the estate unless they were
lower than $3000. This requirement was in eﬀect since 1916 and was was further signiﬁcantly modiﬁed in
1981 (Luckey, 1995). Pavenstedt (1944) reported that the government was winning 40% of the challenges.
The case of Estate of Brownell v. Commissioner (Docket No. 17440-80., United State Tax Court, T.C.
Memo 1982-632; 1982 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 118; 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 1550; T.C.M. (RIA) 82632, October
27, 1982.) is an example of a successful challenge applying to a gift made four months before death by a
97-year old decedent dying in 1976. This particular ﬁnding relied on: relatively small size of the gift (1% of
estate), established policy of making gifts and “decedent son’s testimony that he believed his mother to be
in good health at the time when gifts were made.”
21anything, estimated coeﬃcients are negative. However, gifts made in anticipation of death
are added back to the estate and therefore they lose their tax advantageous status if made
shortly before (expected) death. The negative coeﬃcient could be consistent with increased
giving by those dying instantaneously, who could have expected to beneﬁt from making
gifts prior to 1977: as Joulfaian (2004) documented there was a surge in gifts in 1976 and,
given the three-year rule, these gifts were likely made by people not expecting to die right
away. This eﬀect is however very weak and not present for those with higher wealth.
As a result, it seems that following the onset of a terminal illness taxpayers did not pursue
tax planning by exploiting the diﬀerence in the tax treatment of gifts and estates. This
would have been a diﬃcult strategy given that one would have to claim that estate would
have to, ex post, challenge the presumption that transfers made shortly before death were
not in anticipation of death. Nevertheless one could a priori imagine aggressive planning
of that nature, especially given the tax advantage of inter vivos gifts both due to lower
rates and the lack of integration of gift and estate taxation pre-1977. Were the challenge
unsuccessful, such gifts would show up on Schedule G, consistently with the observed eﬀect.
However, if this strategy was indeed pursued it should have been successful with some
positive probability. The lack of response of inter vivos gifts casts doubt on this possibility.
Instead, ﬁndings regarding the responsiveness of Schedule G and no response of gifts suggest
that taxpayers did make transfer decisions following the onset of a terminal illness but that
these decisions did not necessarily involve outright transfer of ownership before death.
Administrative and funeral expenses. The dataset contains information about ad-
ministrative and funeral expenses. These two types of expenses are combined in a single
category, which is somewhat unfortunate because each type separately could reveal diﬀer-
ent reasons for taxpayers behavior. Tabulations based on the internal IRS data presented
in Bentz (1994) do split these two categories for 1983 data. Administrative expenses are
four times as big as funeral expenses for the sample as a whole. The ﬁling threshold in that
year was $300,000, adjusting for 75% inﬂation factor between 1976 and 1983, it corresponds
to $171,430 of 1976 dollars. The average funeral deduction was $5,400 while the average
administrative expenses were $19,860. The funeral deduction number is very much in line
with funeral costs for wealthy individuals in the AHEAD data. Funeral deduction and ad-
ministrative expenses are split about equally in the lowest, $300,000 to $500,000, category
and the relative importance of administrative expenses grows very quickly with net worth.
Funeral expenses are one of very few “consumption” expenditures reported on the tax
return. Assuming that this is a normal good, a negative response of funeral costs would
therefore be consistent with a real wealth shock experienced by the individual as a result of
the terminal illness. Administrative expenses on the other hand include executors’ commis-
sion and attorneys’ fees: these types of expenses could respond positively if a taxpayer puts
in place instructions that increase legal costs during administration, most likely however the
extra time available for planning allows for reducing ambiguity and uncertainty regarding
intentions of the decedent. As a result, it would be natural to expect a reduction in expendi-
tures for administering the estate. Table 8 shows that administrative and funeral expenses
22are signiﬁcantly and negatively aﬀected by a lengthy terminal illness. The point estimates
hover around a 20% drop in such expenses in the case of a lengthy illness when the whole
population is considered, with almost the same eﬀect for the medium length illnesses. The
results are weaker for the wealthier individuals — the point estimates are still negative and
non-trivial, but much less signiﬁcant. As explained above, this is consistent both with a
real wealth shock if the response is due to funeral costs37 and with more eﬃcient planning.
The extra time for planning should be relevant mostly for individuals who have not
prepared plans for distributing their estates. If this is the right explanation for the respon-
siveness of funeral and administrative expenses, one might expect that the response to the
length of terminal illness falls with age. To test it, I present results for diﬀerent age groups
(second part of Table 8). Indeed, there is a clear pattern that the strength of the response is
age dependent. The response is strongest for individuals younger 60 where a long terminal
illness leads to a drop in administrative expenses by more than 40%. Estimates for other
groups are, however, still large and signiﬁcant. Concluding, the data on administrative and
funeral expenses is consistent with terminal illness providing an opportunity for planning.
Debts. Taxpayers experiencing high medical expenses may ﬁnance them out of their own
wealth or by using debt. It is natural to expect that debt would respond if assets are illiquid.
The last panel of Table 8 shows the corresponding results: there is little evidence that debts
do increase. Estimates are imprecise, and their magnitude is not robust to semi-parametric
approaches. With no exceptions they are insigniﬁcant. Point estimates are negative for
the whole sample and positive for those with net worth greater than $500,000 even though
one would expect that illiquid assets are more of an issue for those with lower net worth.
Alternatively, these results are also consistent with binding liquidity constraint.
Charitable bequests. Charity has high wealth elasticity and therefore it is natural to
expect that a reduction in real net worth would lead to a decrease in charitable contribu-
tions. On the other hand, it is deductible for both income and estate tax purposes. A
deduction for income tax purposes provides an incentive to contribute while alive. Some
popular tax avoidance schemes (such as charitable lead/remainder trusts) involve charita-
ble contributions and according to Cooper (1979) they were well-known in the 1970s. The
results are reported in Table 9. A few diﬀerent measures are considered: the presence of
charity, its share in net worth and the total amount. There is no evidence of a response
when the full sample is considered but a diﬀerent conclusion emerges when one looks at high
net worth individuals. In the higher wealth group, there is in fact evidence of a signiﬁcant
drop in charity.38 In principle, this is consistent with both tax avoidance and a drop in net
worth stories. However, the fact that a stronger response is present for higher net worth
individuals is suggestive of tax avoidance.
37It is also possible that the response of the funeral costs deduction reﬂects pre-payment of funeral expenses.
38Charitable transfers are more common among the wealthier individuals. 7% of individuals with net
worth in the 120,000 to 500,000 range make them, compared to 19% of those with net worth above $500,000.
23Composition of estates. Further insights can be drawn from the composition of estate.
These results are displayed in Table 10.39 Assets in most categories fall with the length of
a terminal illness at the magnitude comparable to that of net worth drop and the results
are fairly similar for both full sample and higher net worth individuals. There are a few
notable exceptions though. First, the largest eﬀect in the full sample is observed for farms
and non-corporate business assets: the estimated coeﬃcient on a lengthy terminal illness is
−.46 in the baseline speciﬁcation.40 This eﬀect is no longer present when one looks at those
with estates greater than $500,000. Results from a linear probability model for the presence
of farm or non-corporate business assets show that, again for the full sample only, that there
is a response on the extensive margin as well. This suggests that small businesses are sold
or transferred inter vivos to children following the onset of a terminal illness of the owner.
Estates of 3181 of 10886 individuals in the sample include farm or non-corporate business
assets, but only 75 of them report all or part of it on the Schedule G. This lends little
credence to the transfer hypothesis and suggests that small businesses may be in fact sold
or scaled down even before death of the principal owner. This eﬀect is no longer present for
those with estates over $500,000, roughly corresponding to the 2005 estate tax threshold,
suggesting that while the eﬀect of the estate tax on the survival of businesses might have
been an issue in the past, it is much less of a concern at the current estate tax threshold.
Second, there is a strong eﬀect on the “household goods and other assets” category,
although it becomes much weaker for larger estates. This asset category is based on the
items reported on Schedule F: “Other Miscellaneous Property” that could not be included
in other categories. Speciﬁc types of property that are listed on the tax form are jewelry,
furs, paintings, antiques, rare books, coins and stamps. This item also includes household
goods. One would expect that such types of assets may be relatively easy to distribute by
the taxpayer before his death or by others after taxpayer’s death.
Third, there is no clear evidence that taxpayers tap into liquid sources ﬁrst: neither
cash nor bonds appear to respond disproportionately strongly. The same ﬁndings do not
indicate that tax evasion was pursued on a major scale: one would expect that it should be
very easy to hide cash from tax collectors yet cash does not appear to be responding more
strongly than other categories of assets. It is still possible that there is rampant tax evasion
with other types of assets exchanged for cash so that, if not for evasion, cash holding would
have increased signiﬁcantly. This possibility is hard to verify using this data.
Corporate stock appears to respond more strongly than other categories of assets. This
may seem surprising in light of the presence of a step-up at death for capital gains tax
purposes, but mid-1970s were a period of weak stock market and accumulated capital gains
may have been less of a concern.41 Furthermore, this is the category that includes closely
39Three categories of assets: life insurance, annuities and mortgages/notes are omitted from the table but
results are available from the author.
40The estimate is −.27 in the Tobit speciﬁcation. For the remaining variables in Table 10 the frequency
of zero values is relatively minor and the results from Tobit speciﬁcations are similar to those presented.
41In fact, subject to the caveats about splitting the dataset in 1976, the response is stronger for 1977 when
S&P 500 fell than in 1976 when it increased.
24held corporations42 that allow for most aggressive tax-motivated adjustments.
5 Conclusions
The ﬁnding of a response of net worth to the lengthy illness is robust to many diﬀerent
speciﬁcation checks: similar results were obtained using a normal-distribution based trun-
cated regression, semi-parametric approaches and by restricting the sample to those with
high 1969 income so that truncation of the sample is less of an issue (this is discussed in
more detail in Appendix A). There is evidence that the eﬀect becomes weaker but does
not disappear with age and the size of net worth. The main analysis was performed on the
sample of married males, but similar eﬀects are present for widowed males and the response
seems stronger for married females. Results for widowed females are weaker. The eﬀect is
also stronger prior to 1977, when eﬀective tax rates were reduced for most of the sample.
A few ﬁndings about items reported on the tax return stand out. First, there is a
very strong response of lifetime transfers: items that still need to be reported on the tax
return but no longer belong to the decedent, either because they were outright transferred
shortly before death or because the transfer takes eﬀect at death. Second, administrative
and funeral expenses fall with a lengthy illness and while this eﬀect is present for everyone,
it is particularly pronounced for younger individuals. Third, debts do not appear to be
increasing. Fourth, most categories of assets do fall with a lengthy illness, with the strongest
eﬀect for farm and non-corporate businesses assets (for smaller estates), corporate assets
and the household goods/other goods categories. Fifth, charitable contributions of the
wealthy fall (because charity is deductible for income tax purposes, an individual planning
ahead is better oﬀ by contributing while alive).
These results indicate that there are signiﬁcant adjustments made to the estate in the
period shortly before death. I argued that the large scale of changes in net worth makes
it diﬃcult to explain them by medical or funeral expenses. In particular, I relied on the
data from AHEAD/HRS exit surveys to show that these types of expenditures are rela-
tively unimportant for the wealthy. I tested whether any loss of income due to terminal
illness played a quantitatively important role in reduction of net worth and rejected this
hypothesis. No evidence of increased indebtedness further suggests that there are no major
liquidity problems and suggests that there is no major real net worth shock. There is some
evidence that a lengthy illness caused a decline in taxable income two years before death,
but the eﬀect on wages is not particularly strong and other income also responds. One pos-
sibility is that taxpayers delay realizing capital gains to beneﬁt from the step-up in basis.
Instead, there are a number of ﬁndings that are consistent with aggressive tax and estate
planning: post mortem administrative costs decline and most importantly lifetime transfers
increase. Changes in the composition of assets on the estate tax return are suggestive of
42Among those with net worth above $120,000, estates of 1.5% individuals (accounting for weights) were
classiﬁed as including a closely held corporation (the value is not available). This is an edited variable and
the number seems small relative to other data published by SOI. For example, estates of 13.7% dying in 1989
included closely held stock (Johnson, 1994). It is also possible that the diﬀerence is due to vastly diﬀerent
tax incentives to incorporate in 1976 and 1989.
25tax planning: business assets and corporate stock both decline, consistently with aggressive
use of discounting technique featured prominently in Cooper (1979), easy to conceal assets
such as household goods also lose value.
The magnitude of estimated responses and potential tax savings foregone by those who
die of instantaneous illness are not trivial. Using 1976 tax rates, a reduction of estates of
those who died instantaneously by 18%, the baseline estimate in the paper, would result
(if all of it constitutes a reduction in taxable estate and does not reduce deductions) in
slashing the average tax payments from $33,000 to $18,000 (the average size of estate was
$330000). Using a diﬀerent metric, an average increase in after tax transfers would be 3.2%.
The magnitude of savings naturally grows with the size of the estate: average increase in
after tax transfers would be 7% for those with net worth of more than $500,000.
I suggest that the wealthy do care about the ultimate distribution and use of their
estates, but they postpone some important decisions until shortly before death. This “pro-
crastination” is consistent with scarcity of inter vivos giving documented in the literature.
Any theory of bequests has to explain why wealthy people need to make any adjustments
to their estate plans shortly before death, thereby bearing risk of not having a chance
to do so in case of accidents or other immediate causes of deaths. It appears that while
people do care about bequests, they attach value to holding on to their wealth. In other
words, planning a priori is costly, either in ﬁnancial, strategic or psychological terms. The
standard explanation is a precautionary saving coupled with a bequest motive. The lack
of evidence that end-of-life expenditures are important for this group casts doubt on this
possibility, although saving for rare, catastrophic, expenditures cannot be fully excluded.
Cross-sectional evidence indicating wealth accumulation that does not weaken by age of 98
also suggests that going beyond a life-cycle model may be required to explain patterns of
wealth accumulation by the wealthy.
Findings in this paper are consistent with holding on to wealth for the purpose of
exerting control. In particular, one possibility is a “strategic” motive where an individual
wants to retain wealth in order to extract services from beneﬁciaries (eg., regular visits).
If, as argued by Schmalbeck (2001), eﬀective tax avoidance requires losing control over
wealth, this type of a bequest motive could explain retaining wealth until shortly before
death despite tax consequences. It could also be consistent with planning shortly before
death. The strategic motive does not ﬁt well with the upward sloping wealth proﬁles and
focusing on this pattern may provide a test of this hypothesis. Another possibility has
to do with saving for low-probability events such as suﬀering from a rare but treatable
disease. While evidence showing low medical expenses of the wealthy shortly before death
does not seem to support it, it is based on a relatively small sample that may not include
such events. This possibility is an example of precautionary motive, but it is probably best
kept conceptually separate, because it is hard to distinguish in the data from utility-from-
wealth or a “capitalistic spirit” motive. All of these arguments could potentially explain
the ﬁndings if coupled with a bequest motive. Finally, results are also consistent with
procrastination in planning for behavioral reasons such as the diﬃculty of acknowledging
own mortality until it no longer can be denied (Kopczuk and Slemrod, 2005).
26This work also adds to the literature on estate taxation. Opponents of this type of
taxation argue that this tax is unfair and particularly burdensome: on top of the payment
itself, the estate tax possibly forces terminally ill taxpayers to spend their last moments on
tax planning, while compliance with the tax imposes an additional burden on orphans and
widows. This paper documents that some planning activity indeed does take place shortly
before death. A popular claim (e.g., Cooper, 1979) is that the estate tax is essentially
voluntary, however Schmalbeck (2001) argued that serious attempts to legally avoid it have
a cost of relinquishing control over assets. The presence of deathbed responses supports the
latter view because it reveals that early planning must have had a cost. Both the lack of
large inter vivos giving observed in standard datasets (McGarry, 1999; Poterba, 2001) and
responsiveness of existing gifts to tax considerations (Bernheim et al., 2004; Joulfaian, 2004)
are consistent with the main message of this paper that while individuals are interested in
the size of their bequests, they simultaneously place a signiﬁcant value on holding on to their
assets while alive. However, drawing far reaching conclusions from these results for estate
taxation is complicated by the fact that data used here is 30 years old and many changes in
economic environment have taken place since. One important change was the introduction
of unlimited marital deduction in 1981. The main empirical ﬁndings in this paper apply to
married males. If the spouse who is ﬁrst to die wants to transfer full estate to the surviving
one, he may do so tax free nowadays. Full reliance on the unlimited marital deduction is in
fact very common. Hence, for this speciﬁc population, tax-motivated responses nowadays
are likely to be smaller. I ﬁnd evidence that similar responses take place for widowed males
as well and therefore the introduction of unlimited marital deduction is unlikely to have
eliminated all responses of this kind. Reliance on marital deduction implies also that actual
taxation takes place nowadays at more advanced age and I ﬁnd that the response during
terminal illness weakens with age. On the other hand, responses for widows may now be
stronger if adjustments at death of the ﬁrst spouse are smaller. Finally, it is possible that the
increased sophistication of tax planning reduces the need and scope for terminal responses.
It should be pointed out though that there was no lack of sophistication in planning thirty
years ago: the estate tax had already been dubbed a “voluntary tax” by Cooper (1979) in
the 1970s. The results in this paper reveal that planning was not fully pursued even though
strategies to reduce taxation were available.
27References
Bentz, Mary F., “Estate Tax Returns, 1983,” in Barry W. Johnson, ed., Compendium
of Federal Estate Tax and Personal Wealth Studies, Department of Treasury, Internal
Revenue Service, Pub. 1773 (4-94), 1994, pp. 3–14.
Bernheim, B. Douglas, Robert J. Lemke, and John Karl Scholz, “Do Estate
and Gift Taxes Aﬀect the Timing of Private Transfers?,” Journal of Public Economics,
December 2004, 88 (12), 2617–34.
Carroll, Christopher D., “Why Do the Rich Save So Much?,” in Joel Slemrod, ed.,
Does Atlas Shrug? The Economic Consequences of Taxing the Rich, New York: Harvard
University Press and Russell Sage Foundation, 2000.
Chay, Kenneth Y. and James L. Powell, “Semiparametric Censored Regression Mod-
els,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fall 2001, 15 (4), 29–42.
Chen, Songnian, “Semiparametric Estimation of the Type-3 Tobit Model,” Journal of
Econometrics, September 1997, 80 (1), 1–34.
Cooper, George, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Tax Avoidance
Studies of Government Finance, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1979.
De Nardi, Mariacristina, “Wealth Inequality and Intergenerational Links,” Review of
Economic Studies, July 2004, 71 (3), 743–768.
Dynan, Karen E., Jonathan Skinner, and Stephen P. Zeldes, “The Importance of
Bequests and Life-Cycle Saving in Capital Accumulation: A New Answer,” American
Economic Review, May 2002, 92 (2), 274–78.
Honore, Bo E and James L. Powell, “Pairwise Diﬀerence Estimator of Censored and
Truncated Models,” Journal of Econometrics, September-October 1994, 64 (1-2), 241–
278.
Honore, Bo E., Ekaterini Kyriazidou, and Christopher Udry, “Estimation of Type
3 Tobit Models Using Symmetric Trimming and Pairwise Comparison,” Journal of Econo-
metrics, January-February 1997, 76 (1-2), 107–128.
Hubbard, R. Glenn, Jonathan Skinner, and Stephen Zeldes, “Precautionary Saving
and Social Insurance,” Journal of Political Economy, April 1995, 103 (2), 360–399.
Johnson, Barry W., “Estate Tax Returns, 1989-1991,” in Barry W. Johnson, ed., Com-
pendium of Federal Estate Tax and Personal Wealth Studies, Department of Treasury,
Internal Revenue Service, Pub. 1773 (4-94), 1994, pp. 51–85.
Joulfaian, David, “Gift Taxes and Lifetime Transfers: Time Series Evidence,” Journal of
Public Economics, August 2004, 88 (9-10), 1917–1929.
28Kahn, Douglas A., “Mandatory Buy-out Agreements for Stock of Closely Held Corpora-
tions,” Michigan Law Review, November 1969, 68 (1), 1–64.
Kopczuk, Wojciech and Joel Slemrod, “Denial of Death and Economic Behavior,”
Advances in Theoterical Economics, 2005, 5 (1), Article 5. http://www.bepress.com/
bejte/advances/vol5/iss1/art5.
and Joseph Lupton, “To Leave or Not to Leave: An Empirical Investigation of the
Distribution of Bequest Motives,” Review of Economic Studies, 2006. Forthcoming.
Luckey, John R., “A History of Federal Estate, Gift and Generation-Skipping Taxes,”
CRS Report for Congress 95-444A, Congressional Research Service March 1995.
McCubbin, Janet G., “Improving Wealth Estimates Derived From Estate Tax Data,” in
Barry W. Johnson, ed., Compendium of Federal Estate Tax and Personal Wealth Studies,
Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Pub. 1773 (4-94), 1994, pp. 363–369.
McGarry, Kathleen, “Inter Vivos Transfers and Intended Bequests,” Journal of Public
Economics, September 1999, 73 (3), 321–51.
National Archives and Records Administration, Documentation for Decedent Public
Use File, January 1974-June 1977 November 8 1995. Accession No: NC3-058-84-002.
Pavenstedt, Edmund W., “Taxation of Transfers in Contemplation of Death: A Proposal
for Abolition,” Yale Law Journal, December 1944, 54 (1), 70–91.
Poterba, James M., “Estate and Gift Taxes and Incentives for Inter Vivos Giving in the
US,” Journal of Public Economics, January 2001, 79 (1), 237–64.
Powell, James L., “Symmetrically Trimmed Least Squares Estimation for Tobit Models,”
Econometrica, November 1986, 54 (6), 1435–60.
, “Estimation of Semiparametric Models,” in Robert F. Engle and Daniel L McFadden,
eds., Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. 4, Amsterdam; New York: Elsevier/North Holland,
1994.
Schmalbeck, Richard, “Avoiding Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes,” in William G. Gale,
James R. Hines Jr., and Joel Slemrod, eds., Rethinking Estate and Gift Taxation, Brook-
ings Institution Press, 2001.
Scholz, John Karl, Ananth Seshadri, and Surachai Khitatrakun, “Are Americans
Saving “Optimally” for Retirement?,” Journal of Political Economy, August 2006, 114
(4), 607–643.
Wooldridge, Jeﬀrey M., Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, Cam-
bridge, MA and London, England: The MIT Press, 2002.
29A Robustness
This section is devoted to analyzing how robust results are to alternative approaches to
dealing with truncation.43 While OLS is biased in the presence of truncation, the bias
depends on how prevalent truncation is. The extent of truncation varies with right-hand
side variables. Conditioning on their values allows for manipulating the extent of truncation
in the subsample. This is illustrated in the ﬁrst three panels of Figure A.1 that shows the
distribution of net worth conditional on 1969 AGI being greater than $0 (full sample),
greater than $50,000 and greater than $100,000. It is clear that we are observing only
the far right tail of the overall wealth distribution (ﬁrst panel). In fact, since the sample
represents only a few percent of deaths, more than 90% of the data should be considered
truncated. As the second panel shows, patterns are very diﬀerent for those with 1969
incomes exceeding $50,000: the mode of the distribution is now visible. The $100,000 panel
further strengthens this point. In the extreme, truncation could be negligible, this does not
appear to be the case though on any of these ﬁgures.
Results of the OLS and truncated regressions in a sample with AGI greater than a
threshold are shown in Table A.1a. The results for the $25,000 and $50,000 groups are
consistent with the previous ﬁnding of a negative eﬀect of a lengthy terminal illness.44
Results for the $100,000 group are not (although, they are insigniﬁcant). This is so despite
the impression from the picture that suggests that the longer illness results in a shift of the
distributions to the left. It is possible that the asymmetry of the “quick” distribution is
at fault here: it leads to a lower mean of that distribution. Figure A.1 suggests that the
comparison of modes of these distributions would lead to a diﬀerent conclusion.45 In the
presence of this kind of asymmetry, the truncated regression model is mis-speciﬁed. Also,
a smaller wealthier sample may be more aﬀected by outliers.
The AGI includes capital gains realization and may be a somewhat noisy measure of
income, possibly contributing to the asymmetry in the lower left panel: some individuals
with relatively low net worth had high AGI in 1969 due to realized capital gains. Capital
gains are not observed directly in the data, but wage and salary income is there. An
alternative approach is to condition on wages. The last panel of Figure A.1 shows densities
conditional on wages being greater than $50,000. It shows a more regular distribution than
the one based on conditioning on AGI greater than $100,000 (with a similar sample size),
43Many other speciﬁcation checks were also performed but are not reported in the tables. The results
are robust to replacing age polynomial by age-speciﬁc dummies and exclusion of the post-1976 dummy. As
an informal check for the relevance of outliers, I also estimated the model without about 100 observations
with net worth exceeding $5 million and without a similar number of those with 1969 AGI exceeding
$250,000. Using four illness dummies for “days,” “weeks,” “months” and “years” instead of two categories
led to negative coeﬃcients of −.028 (p-value 0.539), −.109 (p-value of 0.051), −.103 (p-value of 0.014) and
−.193 (p-value less than 0.001), respectively. They are also virtually unchanged by dropping observations
corresponding the lengthiest (and rare) illness category of “10 years or more.”
44The OLS results for the over $50,000 and over $100,000 groups are very close to the truncated regression
ones, conﬁrming that truncation is no longer quantitatively important for these groups.
45Provided that truncation is not too heavy, the conditional mode restriction allows for identiﬁcation of
the parameter of interest, see Powell (1994)
30strongly suggestive of the presence of a response.
This is supported by formal speciﬁcations in Table A.1b. I consider conditioning on
wages greater than $0, $10,000, $25,000 and $50,000 (the levels are lower to include ap-
proximately the same number of observations as in the case of AGI speciﬁcations). Note
though that using wages to normalize the distribution is problematic in general because
wages are equal to zero for nearly 5000 of almost 11000 observations used for estimation.46
Consequently, including 1969 wages turns out to make little diﬀerence relative to the esti-
mates based on simple least squares when the whole sample is used (compare Table A.1b
column 5 to column 4 in Table 4a).47 The corner value of wages is no longer a problem
when the sample is restricted to those with wages above some ﬁxed positive threshold, and
one can then exploit the potential beneﬁt of the “cleaner” deﬁnition of this variable relative
to AGI. It turns out that the results are not at all sensitive to the choice of the truncation
point for wages in the truncated regression speciﬁcation. The estimates are a bit higher
than .2 for the lengthy illness and of the order of .15 for the medium length illness. The
comparison of the least squares estimates and those based on truncated regression reveals
that the diﬀerence in estimates falls with the level of wage threshold and for those with
wages higher than $25,000 it is almost gone: this is consistent with severely diminished
importance of truncation visible on the last panel of Figure A.1.
The results so far indicate that estates are signiﬁcantly reduced following the onset of a
terminal illness. These estimates have relied, however, on either distributional assumptions
or eliminating part of the sample. Table A.1c shows the results using the symmetrically cen-
sored least squares (SCLS) and symmetrically censored least absolute deviation (SCLAD)
introduced by Powell (1986). All reported standard errors are based on 1000 bootstrap
replications.48 These estimators assume a symmetric distribution of errors conditional on
regressors rather than a parametric distributional assumption. Under this assumption,
given a candidate regression line, symmetric truncation from above restores the zero con-
ditional mean or median in the doubly truncated sample. This observation is relied upon
in identiﬁcation the coeﬃcients of interest. These approaches have two major advantages:
ﬁrst, they only impose symmetry on the distribution of the error terms conditional on re-
gressors; second they also allow for heteroskedasticity. The drawback of these procedures is
that they eﬀectively rely on only a subset of observations (dubbed “interior observations”
in the table) and as such they tend to be much noisier. Almost all coeﬃcients in Table A.1c
are negative and in many cases signiﬁcant. They are also quite close to the estimates based
on the normality assumption that were presented before, with the sole exception of the
symmetrically censored LAD approach for those with net worth over $250,000.
46By contrast, only 850 otherwise usable observations have AGI that’s missing or equal to zero.
47Wages are included as the logarithm of one plus the dollar value.
48While these estimators have been shown to be asymptotically normal, the asymptotic covariance matrix
is not straightforward to compute and the usual practice (see Chay and Powell 2001) is to bootstrap instead.
Furthermore, in our context observations are weighted using IRS sample weights and the exact formula for
the covariance matrix in that case is not known.
31B How strong the mortality bias would have to be.
The main concern about cross-sectional estimates of wealth proﬁles in the paper has to
do with wealth-mortality gradient: mortality rates may be decreasing with wealth so that
sample surviving to older ages may be richer than the rest. Note that what is required for
this to be the case is diﬀerential mortality within the sample. Hence, evidence of selection
relative to the whole population is not particularly informative. In fact, it would be surpris-
ing if this population was not longer-lived than the average. Indeed, for males, deaths in the
sample constitute 8% of all deaths in the 45-55 range and 17.6% of deaths above 85, with a
clear monotone relationship throughout. Similarly deaths in my sample as a fraction of the
population of a given age increase with age (data based on information available through
the Human Mortality Database, www.mortality.org and Census population estimates).
To investigate how strong selection eﬀects need to be to explain my results, I applied
the following approach. I start with the population of 55-65 years old married males with
initial net worth above $120000 (one can see in Figure 1 that the estimated wealth proﬁle is
still fairly ﬂat in this age group) and to focus on selection I simulated for this population the
pattern of average wealth that would be observed among those dying as this group ages. To
focus on selective mortality, I assumed that their wealth stays constant over time (so that
truncation is not an issue here; of course it is controlled for in the paper) but that mortality
is a function of wealth. Speciﬁcally, I assumed that the annual mortality rate at age t is





ln(2). Here, mt is a constant and mt(W) is mortality for a
person with wealth W. A person with $120000 (the threshold for including in the sample)
has mortality rate equal to mt, and doubling wealth implies dividing the mortality rate by
a factor of r. For example, if r = 3 a person that has twice as much wealth would have one
third the mortality rate. When r = 1, there is no wealth-mortality gradient. Thus, higher
r implies more mortality bias. In place of mt, I used either the mortality rates in 1976 as
estimated by the SSA and available through www.mortality.org or the same rates corrected
for the socioeconomic factors as estimated by Brown, Liebman and Pollet (2002).49 The
results are not very sensitive to the choice of mortality rates (numbers below are socio-
economic status adjusted), but lower baseline mortality rates reduce the eﬀect and their
impact is most visible at older ages (the baseline rates I use are very likely to be conservative
because the socioeconomic correction factor pertains to a very broad group).
Assuming an extremely large factor r = 2 (people with $240,000 have half the mortality
rate of people with $120,000 indeﬁnitely, people with $480,000 have a quarter of the rate
etc.), the observed logarithm for the initial sample would increase from 12.31 at age 65 to
12.52 at age 85 and it would further increase to 12.83 by age of 95. The 65-85 change implies
the gradient of 1.1%, the 85 to 95 change implies the gradient of 3.1%. The former is much
lower than estimated in the paper, the latter is similar to the one estimated in the data.
49 Brown, Jeﬀrey R., Jeﬀrey B. Liebman, and Joshua Pollet, “Estimating Life Tables That Reﬂect So-
cioeconomic Diﬀerences in Mortality,” in Martin Feldstein and Jeﬀrey B. Liebman, eds., The Distributional
Aspects of Social Security and Social Security Reform, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago
Press, 2002, pp. 447–457. I use rates for white males with at least high school education.
32These assumptions imply that the average 65-year old person in the sample has 6 times
better odds of surviving until 95 than the person with $120000 of initial assets. Capping
mortality improvements at say, three times $120000, reduces the gradient between 65 and
85 to 0.75% and between 85 and 95 to 1.9%, while still implying that the average person
in the sample has 5 times higher chance of surviving to 95 than a person with wealth of
$120,000. Using a factor r = 1.1 would imply a gradient of 0.6% between 65 and 85 and
1.1% between 85 and 95.
Note that these assumptions imply that very large mortality improvements are occurring
within the top 6% of wealth distribution. As a comparison, the numbers in Hurd, McFadden
and Merrill (NBER #7440) imply that the person that is simultaneously in the highest
quartile of wealth, income and education has the mortality rate lower by 0.066 than the
person that is in the lowest quartile by all three metrics. With their reported average
mortality rate over a two-year period of 0.107, this implies an improvement of mortality
by a factor of two. Hence, the assumption of r = 2 implies that mortality improvements
resulting from doubling wealth while within the top 6% are similar as those resulting from
moving the person from the lowest to the highest quartile using all three socioeconomic
status metrics. Even with such huge mortality diﬀerentials, the patterns in the data are
matched only at very old ages (my understanding is that socio-economic diﬀerentials do
become weaker at older ages so that the gradient at older ages in my simulations is likely
to be overstated). Using estimates corresponding to moving from the third to the fourth
quartile of wealth distribution would imply a reduction in mortality rate by 0.9 (though
these diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant), roughly corresponding to r = 1.1, the
factor for which the results are reported above and come short of matching the patterns in
the data.
Concluding, if wealth proﬁles were ﬂat, explaining estimates in the paper would require
that selection eﬀects resulting from doubling wealth within the top 6% of wealth distribution
would have to be stronger than the maximum diﬀerence between groups deﬁned by quartiles
of wealth, income and education as estimated by Hurd, McFadden and Merrill (NBER
#7440). If wealth proﬁles were in fact downward sloping, selection eﬀects would have to be
even stronger (note that truncation is corrected for in the paper).
33Table 1: Summary statistics for married males by length of terminal illness
Quick Medium Long
Net worth 327926 335491 330867
Age 66.72 71.06 69.93
Post 1976 0.190 0.223 0.227
1969 AGI 23258 24275 23945
1974 AGI 29566 30091 28495
1969 Wages 9699 8597 9213
1974 Wages 11242 8824 9431
1969 Divid./Interest 5065 6702 5820
1974 Divid./Interest 8793 11477 9749
Schedule G 14649 22206 25601
Presence of Sch. G 0.100 0.125 0.180
Gift return 0.128 0.145 0.143
Total deductions 183763 182022 183045
Charitable bequests 6900 6800 9165
Quick Medium Long
Marital deduction140463 143320 138258
Deductible debts 24949 21318 21417
Funeral/admin. 11861 10929 11062
Stock 90764 94328 90521
Bonds 22063 29075 28855
Cash 45415 50148 46548
Real estate 101207 96017 92413
Farm/Non-corp. 12935 11740 10441
Life insurance 36022 24705 26725
Annuities 2634 2509 2485
Other assets 10230 9599 9021
Mortgages/notes 15158 15127 14783
Sum of weights 8363 14177 18462
Observations 2264 3842 4780
“Quick” category corresponds to instantaneous death, “medium” one includes illness lasting hours, days or weeks and
“long” category refers to illness lasting months or years.
Table 2: The length of illness
All Females Males
Age category QuickMediumLong QuickMediumLong QuickMediumLong
Total 0.17 0.36 0.47 0.12 0.38 0.50 0.20 0.35 0.45
30 0.34 0.32 0.34 0.24 0.35 0.40 0.35 0.32 0.33
40 0.29 0.27 0.44 0.15 0.20 0.65 0.31 0.28 0.41
50 0.25 0.28 0.47 0.13 0.28 0.59 0.29 0.28 0.43
60 0.19 0.31 0.49 0.13 0.30 0.56 0.21 0.32 0.47
70 0.17 0.36 0.46 0.15 0.35 0.50 0.19 0.37 0.44
80 0.12 0.42 0.46 0.11 0.43 0.46 0.14 0.40 0.46
90 0.10 0.44 0.46 0.09 0.44 0.47 0.11 0.44 0.44
“Quick” category corresponds to instantaneous death, “medium” one includes illness lasting hours, days or weeks and
“long” category refers to illness lasting months or years.
Table 3: AGI and the length of illness
AGI 1969 AGI 1969
(’69>50K)
AGI 1974 AGI 1974
(’69>50K)
∆AGI
Medium illness0.034 0.035 0.007 -0.039 -0.016
(0.031) (0.036) (0.028) (0.086) (0.021)
Long illness 0.053 -0.009 -0.006 -0.229 -0.046
(0.029)∗ (0.030) (0.026) (0.082)∗∗∗ (0.021)∗∗
1969 AGI -0.366
(0.014)∗∗∗
N 10887 2371 10763 2538 10399
Results are from OLS regressions. Medium illness includes illness lasting hours, days or weeks, long illness refers to
illness lasting months or years. The omitted category is instantaneous death. The dependent variables are logarithms
of one plus the actual dollar values. All regressions include a third degree polynomial in age and a dummy for 1977
observations. “***” denotes signiﬁcance at 1% level, “**” denotes signiﬁcance at 5% level and “*” denotes signiﬁcance
at 10% level.
34Table 4a: Baseline speciﬁcations, controlling for AGI 1969
OLS Truncated regression
Medium illness-0.026 -0.037 -0.220 -0.107
(0.016) (0.015)∗∗ (0.130)∗ (0.043)∗∗
Long illness -0.049 -0.066 -0.412 -0.182
(0.015)∗∗∗ (0.014)∗∗∗ (0.127)∗∗∗ (0.040)∗∗∗
1969 AGI 0.315 0.315 0.971 0.973
(0.008)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.025)∗∗∗ (0.026)∗∗∗
N 10886 10886 10886 10886 10886 10886
Table 4b: Varying truncation thresholds of net worth
Truncated regression
> 250K > 500K > 1000K (120,500] (500,1000]
Medium illness -0.056 -0.050 -0.015 -0.094 -0.103
(0.070) (0.091) (0.200) (0.055)∗ (0.118)
Long illness -0.142 -0.161 -0.081 -0.161 -0.113
(0.069)∗∗ (0.090)∗ (0.198) (0.053)∗∗∗ (0.112)
1969 AGI 1.236 1.247 1.327 0.570 0.614
(0.049)∗∗∗ (0.081)∗∗∗ (0.213)∗∗∗ (0.056)∗∗∗ (0.022)∗∗∗
N 7020 4701 1512 6185 3189
Table 4c: Splitting the sample in 1977
Before 1977 In 1977
> 120K > 250K > 500K > 120K > 250K > 500K
Medium illness-0.120 -0.101 -0.026 -0.058 0.181 -0.212
(0.049)∗∗ (0.072) (0.096) (0.078) (0.171) (0.296)
Long illness -0.202 -0.176 -0.196 -0.112 0.069 0.109
(0.047)∗∗∗ (0.070)∗∗ (0.094)∗∗ (0.075) (0.167) (0.285)
1969 AGI 1.022 1.218 1.188 0.749 1.299 1.601
(0.030)∗∗∗ (0.053)∗∗∗ (0.072)∗∗∗ (0.044)∗∗∗ (0.134)∗∗∗ (0.248)∗∗∗
N 8737 5733 3922 2149 1287 779
Table 4d: Other demographic groups













Medium illness-0.098 -0.884 -0.041 -0.100 -0.232 0.005
(0.082) (0.479)∗ (0.065) (0.123) (0.471) (0.122)
Long illness -0.225 -1.534 -0.110 -0.213 -0.866 0.064
(0.082)∗∗∗ (0.561)∗∗∗ (0.064)∗ (0.125)∗ (0.496)∗ (0.124)
1969 AGI 0.957 1.078 0.989 1.041 1.000 1.135
(0.037)∗∗∗ (0.247)∗∗∗ (0.030)∗∗∗ (0.081)∗∗∗ (0.225)∗∗∗ (0.077)∗∗∗
N 2392 286 3399 1121 122 1666
Notes for Tables 4a-4d: unless indicated otherwise, results are based on a truncated regression model assuming
normal distribution of the error terms. The dependent variable is the logarithm of net worth. Medium illness includes
illness lasting hours, days or weeks, long illness refers to illness lasting months or years. The omitted category is
instantaneous death. All regressions include a third degree polynomial in age and a dummy for 1977 observations.
Except for Table 4d, the sample consists of married males only. The baseline sample consists of individuals with net
worth above $120000. The remaining speciﬁcations include a subset of individuals with net worth in the indicated
range. “***” denotes signiﬁcance at 1% level, “**” denotes signiﬁcance at 5% level and “*” denotes signiﬁcance at
10% level.
35Table 5: Parametric speciﬁcations, controlling for AGI 1969 and interaction with age
All All Age≤60 Age∈
(60,80]
Age>80
Medium illness -0.209 -0.100 -0.224 -0.070 -0.063
(0.132) (0.043)∗∗ (0.113)∗∗ (0.055) (0.090)
Medium*(Age-70)0.015 0.008
(0.012) (0.004)∗∗
Long illness -0.409 -0.174 -0.353 -0.133 -0.140
(0.128)∗∗∗ (0.041)∗∗∗ (0.106)∗∗∗ (0.053)∗∗ (0.087)
Long*(Age-70) 0.019 0.008
(0.011)∗ (0.003)∗∗
1969 AGI 0.971 1.284 0.949 0.889
(0.025)∗∗∗ (0.111)∗∗∗ (0.033)∗∗∗ (0.038)∗∗∗
N 10886 10886 2127 6505 2254
The dependent variable is the logarithm of net worth. Medium illness includes illness lasting hours, days or weeks, long
illness refers to illness lasting months or years. The omitted category is instantaneous death. All speciﬁcations are
estimated using truncated regression under normality assumption. All speciﬁcations include a third degree polynomial
in age and a dummy for 1977 observations. “***” denotes signiﬁcance at 1% level, “**” denotes signiﬁcance at 5%
level and “*” denotes signiﬁcance at 10% level.









Medium illness -0.042 -0.167 -0.091 -0.079 -0.107 -0.103 -0.185 -0.080
(0.026) (0.139) (0.087) (0.033)∗∗ (0.042)∗∗ (0.040)∗∗ (0.556) (0.063)
Long illness -0.085 -0.174 -0.160 -0.135 -0.183 -0.172 -0.627 -0.177
(0.026)∗∗∗ (0.127) (0.084)∗ (0.031)∗∗∗ (0.040)∗∗∗ (0.038)∗∗∗ (0.507) (0.059)∗∗∗
1969 AGI 0.912 0.759 0.949 0.301 0.972 0.976 0.949 0.991
(0.015)∗∗∗ (0.060)∗∗∗ (0.041)∗∗∗ (0.023)∗∗∗ (0.026)∗∗∗ (0.025)∗∗∗ (0.044)∗∗∗ (0.025)∗∗∗
1974 AGI 0.721
(0.026)∗∗∗
1969 wages -0.055 -0.046
(0.004)∗∗∗ (0.007)∗∗∗










Selection term 0.422 -0.495 0.821
(0.015)∗∗∗ (0.078)∗∗∗ (0.047)∗∗∗
N 10404 10543 8616 10404 10543 10543 10886 10886
The results in the left panel are obtained using OLS while correcting for incidental truncation by using the residual
from the ﬁrst stage truncated regression under normality assumption. The dependent variable is as indicated in the
table. Standard errors are based on bootstrapping the two-step procedure 1000 times. Results in the right panel
are based on a truncated regression model assuming normal distribution of the error terms. Medium illness includes
illness lasting hours, days or weeks, long illness refers to illness lasting months or years. The omitted category is
instantaneous death. All regressions include a third degree polynomial in age and a dummy for 1977 observations.
The sample consists of married males with net worth above $120000. “***” denotes signiﬁcance at 1% level, “**”


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































39Table A.1a: Robustness: varying threshold for AGI in 1969
OLS Truncated regression
> 25K > 50K > 100K > 25K > 50K > 100K
Medium illness-0.053 -0.169 0.022 -0.082 -0.207 0.025
(0.033) (0.073)∗∗ (0.181) (0.050) (0.089)∗∗ (0.204)
Long illness -0.076 -0.164 0.003 -0.115 -0.200 0.003
(0.030)∗∗ (0.067)∗∗ (0.166) (0.047)∗∗ (0.081)∗∗ (0.190)
1969 AGI 0.773 0.721 0.526 0.989 0.811 0.570
(0.036)∗∗∗ (0.084)∗∗∗ (0.184)∗∗∗ (0.042)∗∗∗ (0.087)∗∗∗ (0.188)∗∗∗
N 5090 2371 739 5090 2371 739
Table A.1b: Robustness: varying threshold for wages in 1969
OLS Truncated regression
All > 10K > 25K > 50K All > 10K > 25K > 50K
Medium illness-0.026 -0.050 -0.088 -0.119 -0.214 -0.210 -0.165 -0.144
(0.016) (0.025)∗∗ (0.053)∗ (0.137) (0.129)∗ (0.092)∗∗ (0.095)∗ (0.154)
Long illness -0.049 -0.074 -0.122 -0.198 -0.409 -0.281 -0.215 -0.230
(0.015)∗∗∗ (0.024)∗∗∗ (0.052)∗∗ (0.135) (0.127)∗∗∗ (0.089)∗∗∗ (0.095)∗∗ (0.154)
1969 wages 0.005 0.636 1.037 1.055 0.042 1.880 1.589 1.169
(0.001)∗∗∗ (0.020)∗∗∗ (0.051)∗∗∗ (0.141)∗∗∗ (0.011)∗∗∗ (0.094)∗∗∗ (0.092)∗∗∗ (0.161)∗∗∗
N 10886 3995 1826 594 10886 3995 1826 594
Table A.1c: Robustness: semi-parametric approaches
Symmetrically censored LAD SCLS
> 120K > 250K > 500K > 120K > 250K > 500K
Medium illness-0.117 -0.012 -0.075 -0.059 -0.023 -0.013
(0.075) (0.134) (0.136) (0.055) (0.142) (0.141)
Long illness -0.149 0.036 -0.329 -0.114 -0.094 -0.189
(0.073)∗∗ (0.151) (0.168)∗ (0.051)∗∗ (0.168) (0.163)
1969 AGI 0.933 0.878 0.737 0.883 0.878 0.652
(0.043)∗∗∗ (0.193)∗∗∗ (0.142)∗∗∗ (0.042)∗∗∗ (0.076)∗∗∗ (0.193)∗∗∗
N 10886 7020 4701 10886 7020 4701
Interior obs. 4516 2060 910 4558 2063 1241
The dependent variable is the logarithm of net worth. All speciﬁcations include a third degree polynomial in age and
a dummy for 1977 observations. Medium illness includes illness lasting hours, days or weeks, long illness refers to
illness lasting months or years. The omitted category is instantaneous death. The sample consists of married males
with net worth above $120000. The ﬁrst two panels show OLS estimates and results from a truncated regression
under the normality assumption. The speciﬁcations marked all “All” include married males with net worth above
$120000. Other speciﬁcations include only individuals with either 1969 AGI or 1969 wages and salaries greater than
the indicated value. Results in the third panel are estimated using either SCLS or SCLAD, as indicated. The row
marked “Interior obs.” lists the number of observations that remain uncensored. Standard errors are constructed
using 1000 bootstrap replications.
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